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Takings, Fairness, and Farmland Preservation
MARK W. CORDES'
Fannland preservation has become a growing societal concern in recent
years, most clearly seen in the variety of state and local efforts to address
conversion problems. Although each of these programs has a legitimate role to
play in preservingfannland, the need to restrict landowners ability to sell makes
agricultural zoning a necessary and central component of preservation efforts.
Agricultural zoning is controversial, however, because of the significant
financial impact it often imposes on landowners under the greatest conversion
pressure. In particular, it is commonly subject to two related concerns: that the
substantial diminution in value constitutes an unconstitutional taking and, even if
constitutional, that the substantial economic burdens are unfair.
Professor Cordes examines each of these concerns and demonstrates that
agricultural zoning should not nonnally constitute a taking or be viewed as
inherently unfair, despite substantial economic impacts on landowners. Most
agricultural zoning should not be a taking under Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence, which focuses on whether property remains economically viable.
This has been borne out by lower court decisions that have consistently rejected
takings challenges to agricultural zoning. Similarly, agricultural zoning is not
inherently unfair even when resulting in substantial economic loss. Such losses
must be evaluated in a broader regulatory framework, in which much of the
property values were created by government ''givings" and in which landowners
benefit from other regulatory schemes. Moreover, our legal system has long
recognized that property ownership is subject to the broader public interest, and
reasonable landowner expectations must inc01porate the possibility of
regulation tofarther such interests.
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is converting farmland at substantial rates. 1 Although
several factors account for this conversion, the basic reason for most farmland
conversion is simple economics: as the suburbs expand, farmland will often bring
a higher price in alternative, more intensive land uses, such as residential or
commercial. Whatever its broader worth to society as farmland, to the immediate
parties involved the land is more valuable converted. This has often included
some of America's best and most productive farmland.2
Whether farmland conversion presents a societal problem is subject to some
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author would like to
thank Kristen Drake and Melissa Irick for their research assistance in the preparation of this
article.
l See generally A. ANN SORENSEN Er AL., AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON
TIIE EDGE (1997) (discussing the report of the American Fannland Trust that documented
substantial conversion ofAmerica's best fannland); infra text accompanying notes 14-43.
2 SORENSEN Er AL., supra note I, at 2-3, 8-20.
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debate.3 Nonetheless, all levels of government have perceived fannland
conversion as a problem and have responded with a variety of programs to slow
and control the rate of conversion.4 Some of these might be viewed as voluntary
incentives to encourage farmers not to convert fannland, such as special tax
incentive programs or recognition of agricultural districts. These provide :financial
incentives for farmers to help alleviate conversion pressure. Similarly, right-to
farm laws protect farming activities against nuisance actions based on
encroaching development.
Although each of the above are important components of fannland
preservation efforts, commentators have noted they are often ineffective in
stopping conversion.s AB a practical matter such voluntary incentives are rarely
enough to stop conversion in the long run, since they only partially offset the

3 Several major reports in recent years have documented the loss of farmland and
concluded that it presents a major problem. See id. at 2-3,8-20; see generally U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC. & PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENvlL. QUALITY, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS
STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981), [hereinafter NALS]. This perception is joined by a substantial
amount of both academic and popular commentary. See generally, e.g., TOM DANIELS &
DEBORAH BOWERS,HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA'S FARMS AND FARMLANDS
(1997); Lawrence W. Libby,Farmland Protectionfor lllinois: The Planning and Legal Issues
17 N. ILL. U. L. REY. 425 (1997); Luther Tweeten,Food Security and Farmland Preservation,
3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237 (1998). A number of commentators, however, have questioned
whether farmland conversion is in fact a problem, or is at least to the degree often stated by
proponents ofpreservation. See generally, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, A Comprehensive State and
Local Government Land Use Control Strategy to Preserve the Nations Farmland is
Unnecessary and Unwise, 34 U. KAN. L. REY. 519 (1986); William A. Fischel, The
Urbanization of Urban Land: A Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 LAND
ECON. 236 (1982); Ralph E. Heimlich & Kenneth S. Krupa, Changes in Land Quality
Accompanying Urbanization in U.S. Fast-Growth Counties, 49 J. OF SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION 367, 373-74 (1994); Urban Land Inst., Has the Farmland Crisis Been
Overstated? Recommendations for Balancing Urban and Agricultural Land Needs, in 1983
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 235 (Fredric Strom ed.,1983).
4 The federal government has initiated several actions directed toward farmland
preservation, including passage of the Farmland Protection Policy Act in 1981, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 4201 to 4209 (1994),and passage ofthe Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996 (FAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered
provisions of Title 7 of the United States Code). All 50 states have enacted a variety of
measures designed to preserve farmland, including tax incentive provisions,right-to-farm laws,
agricultural districting,and special Purchase ofDevelopment Rights (PDR) programs. See infra
Part LC. Local governments also extensively regulate farmland, usually through zoning
provisions. See, e.g., NALS, supra note 3, at 63-75 (discussing varieties oflocal government
efforts to preserve farmland).
5 See SARAH E. REDFIELD,VANISHING FARMLAND: A LEGAL SOLUTION FOR TIIE STATES
96-97 (1984); William L. Church,Farmland Conversion: The Viewfrom 1986, 1986 U. lLL. L.
REY. 521, 550; James B. Wadley, Small Farms: The USDA, Rural Communities and Urban
Pressures, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 478,493 (1981-1982).
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financial benefits of conversion.6 At best they only delay conversion, at times
subsidizing farmland while it is in a holding pattern. In particular, by letting
property owners themselves retain the ultimate decision on whether to convert,
such voluntary programs will almost always be ineffective.
Therefore, local governments have increasingly looked to preservation
methods that restrict a landowner's ability to convert. In a limited number of
instances, local governments have pursued Purchase of Development Rights
(PDR) or Transferrable Development Rights (IDR) programs,7 which at least
partially shift the cost of preservation back to the government by providing
compensation to the property owner. More commonly, however, government has
achieved this through some form of conventional zoning.& This in effect restricts
any development rights on the part of the property owner without paying
compensation.
Although financially prudent for local government, agricultural zoning and
other public restrictions on farmland can at times result in substantial diminution
in value to landowners. This is particularly true ,vith farmland under the greatest
conversion pressure on the urban :fi.inge, where market values might be several
times greater if the property can be developed.9 As a result, two closely related
concerns have often been raised by property owners. First, property owners have
often challenged such zoning as an unconstitutional taking, especially where
substantial diminution in value results.IO Second, beyond any takings challenge,
property rights proponents have argued that restrictions which preclude any
development on undeveloped land, including farmland, are unfair where
landowners suffer substantial loss in value.11 In particular, property rights
6 See Church,supra note 5,at 550.
7 See Jeanne S. White,Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss ofFann/and and
Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENvTL. C 113, 135-43
(1998) (discussing successful IDR and conservation easement programs to preserve farmland).
8 See generally Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Fann/and Preservation: A Vital
Agricultural Law Issuefor the 1980s, 21 WASHBURNLJ. 443,451 (1981-82).
9 See, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County ofMcHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (111. App.
Ct. 1993) (holding that property value doubled ifrezoned for development); Wilson v. County
of McHenry, 416 N.E2d 426, 429 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (descnbing fivefold increase if
agricultural land rezoned for development); Van Arsdel v. Township ofAddison,195 N.W2d
21,23 (Mich. Ct App. 1972) (describing at least threefold increase ifagricultural land rezoned
for development).
10 See infra Part II. B. (discussing state-court review of''takings" challenges to agricultural
zoning).
11 See Private Property Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 161 Before the House Agric.
Subcomm. on Dep't Operations and Nutrition, 102d Cong. 97-102 (1993) (testimony ofBen
Love on behalfofNat'I Cattlemen's Assoc.); Stephen C. Fehr,Montgomery's Line ofDefense
Against the Suburban Invasion, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at A l (descnbing fairness
concerns raised by farmers in efforts to preserve farmland in Montgomery County,Maryland);
David Helvarg,Legal Assault on the Environment: 'Property Rights' Movement, NATION, Jan.
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proponents have suggested that agricultural zoning is unfair because it forces a
few landowners to bear the cost of preserving farmland for the benefit of many.
This latter fairness argmnent is an important one for environmental regulation
in general, and farmland preservation in particular.12 Even assmning
constitutionality, fairness is an important component in setting policy and affects
the political acceptability of alternative outcomes. Moreover, fairness argmnents
have been at the heart of recent efforts to legislatively expand compensable
takings, with farmland issues being an important dimension of that effort.13
This Article will examine the validity of agricultural zoning as a technique to
preserve farmland, and in particular the extent to which it raises takings and
fairness concerns. Its basic premise is that agricultural zoning does not, in most
instances, constitute a taking. Moreover, public restrictions on farmland are not
inherently unfair, even when they result in a substantial diminution in value.
When feasible, alternative techniques such as PDR and IDR programs, which
provide at least some offsetting compensation, are appropriate to mitigate the
economic impact of zoning and might better balance the respective private and
public interests involved. When implemented, these alternative approaches might
also be more effective at preserving farmland, since they can more effectively
withstand political change and pressure. Yet PDR and IDR programs face
significant practical constraints which limit their overall effectiveness as farmland
preservation techniques, and in their absence traditional zoning should not be
viewed as inherently unfair.
Part II briefly discusses some background issues, including a brief discussion
of farmland conversion, some of the argmnents for preservation, and a
rudimentary overview of preservation techniques. Part III considers whether
agricultural zoning might constitute a taking, examining both current Supreme
Court analysis and lower court treatment of takings challenges to agricultural
zoning. It indicates that under both current Supreme Court takings jurisprudence,
as well as lower court treatment of the issue, agricultural zoning will rarely
30, 1995, at 126, 128 (noting that many political observers see the Fann Bureau as a major
force behind takings legislation initiatives).
1 2 For an excellent discussion of the need to address fairness concerns in environmental
law, including those surrounding property rights, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in
Environmental Law, 27 ENvTL. L. 705 (1997).
13 The last decade has seen a significant ''property rights" movement in this country
designed to expand the scope ofcompensable takings. This has involved not only court actions,
but significant legislative efforts at both the state and federal level to expand takings. Most
commonly, this has involved "assessment'' statutes which require government officials to assess
whether their actions constitute a taking under current judicial standards. A number of states
have also considered compensation statutes which would require compensation when
government regulation reduces the value ofland by a certain percentage, such as 50%. To date
such compensation statutes have been passed in only four states. See Mark W. Cordes,
Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise ofState Takings Legislation, 24 EcOLOGYL.Q. 187,
212-20 (1997).
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constitute an unconstitutional taking. Finally, Part IV addresses the issue of
fairness in fannland preseivation, suggesting three reasons why agricultural
zoning should not be viewed as inherently unfair even when substantial
diminution in value results. These are the concept of government "givings" that
enhance land values in the first instance; recognition of general regulatory
reciprocity which mitigates fairness concerns; and the nature of property rights,
which has loni viewed private interests as being subject to broader public needs.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem ofConversion
As was mentioned above, the United States is converting fannland at
considerable rates. Although occasional warnings were given about the problem
in the 1960s and 1970s, the problem gained national attention by the now well
lmmvn National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) in 1981, conducted by the
United States Department of Agriculture and the President's Council on
Environmental Quality.14 The study conducted a comprehensive inventory of the
nation's agricultural land base as of 1977, looking at conversion patterns, varying
quality of fannland, existing agricultural reseives, projected conversion rates, and
the future need for fannland. The study estimated that the nation's non-federally
mvned agricultural land base at that time was 1.36 billion acres, which included
413 million acres of cropland, with the remaining land divided primarily between
rangeland, pastureland, and forestland.15 For purposes of the study, the most
important category was the "cropland base," which included the then cmrent 413
million acres of cropland as well as an additional 127 million acres of "potential
cropland," comprised of land with high or medium cropland potential from the
other categories of land.1 6 Thus, the study viewed the nation's cropland base as
consisting of 540 million total acres.
The study further examined changes within the agricultural land base, such as
shifting of cropland in and out of other agricultural categories.17 Central to its
14 NALS, supra note 3.

15 The agricultural land base consisted of413 million acres ofcropland, 414 million acres
ofrangeland, 376 million acres offorestland, 133 million acres ofpastureland, and 23 million
acres ofother farmland. See id. at 28-29.
16 Id. at 28-30.
17 For the years 1967-75 the study noted a relatively large amount of land that shifted
between different uses within the agricultural land base, including shifting in and out of
cropland use. This "indicate[d] considerable flexibility in how American farmers, ranchers and
foresters use the nation's agricultural land base." Id. at 32. It also noted, however, that often
"shifts ofland from cropland uses are not considered readily reversible," with only one-third of
the land shifted from cropland use during 1967-75 still having high or medium potential as
future cropland. Id.
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study, however, was its finding that three million acres were annually being
converted from the agricultural land base to nonagricultural uses-one million
acres of which were from the cropland base.1 8 More than two-thirds of the land
converted to nonagricultural use was attributable to urban build-up and
transportation uses, with approximately an additional thirty percent being
displaced by "reservoirs, lakes, and other water-impounding facilities."19 The
study attributed most of this conversion to changing living patterns, noting the
substantial spreading of residential development into rural America. It noted that
the "highest rates of population growth occurred in the open country and in
unincorporated areas," and were often accompanied by scattered development on
large lots.20
Although the rate of farmland conversion did not present an immediate threat
to the nation's welfare,21 the study sounded a substantial alarm about the long
term consequences that would occur if current conversion rates remained
unchecked. In particular, it noted that the United States would increasingly be
involved with international food markets, which had become an important part of
our economic base.22 Thus, even if current inventories were adequate to meet our
own food needs in the foreseeable future, viewed from a more global perspective
the rate of farmland conversion was "cause for serious concem.''23 The study did
not recommend a complete stop of conversion, which would have been
unrealistic, but did recommend that the nation undertake a number of immediate
steps to begin to slow the conversion rate and steer its direction. Although many
of the specific recommendations were directed at the federal level,24 the study
recognized that the problem was largely local in nature and encouraged state and
local governments to undertake various efforts to control conversion.25
The NALS had a substantial impact, giving impetus to passage of the federal
Farmland Protection Policy Act in 1981,26 and reinforcing the already growing
concern at the state and local level for the need to protect farmland. Despite its
influence, the NALS has been subject to significant criticism.27 Several responses
18 See id. at 8, 35-37.
l9 Id. at 35.

20 Id. at 10.

21 See id. at 17.

22 See id. at 84.

23 Id. at 85.
24 See id. at 88-97 (discussing reconnnendations aimed at the federal and national level).

25 See id. at 86 (''These reconnnendations emphasize the primary roles of states and local

governments in conserving agricultural land and the supporting roles which can be played by
agencies at the federal level.").
26 Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201 to 4209 (1994). For connnentary on the
Act, see generally Cotwin W. Johnson & Valerie M. Fogelman, The Fann/and Protection
Policy Act: Stillbirth ofa Policy?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REY. 563.
27 See LINDA A. MALoNE, ENvlR.ONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 6.03 (1998)
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challenged its farmland conversion figures as "either exaggerated or ultimately
unimportant,"28 arguing that less conversion was taking place than reported and
that more potential cropland existed than reported. Similarly, critics questioned
the NALS's projections about future demand as being exaggerated, and further
faulted the study for not considering future increases in crop yield.29 Even some
sympathetic to farmland preservation noted the tenuous basis of some of the
study's projections.30 Indeed, the years since the NALS have shown that some of
its projections were overdrawn, especially concerning the state of the agricultural
land base as we approach the year 2000. Rather than having reached the limits of
all current and reserve cropland, we currently retain sufficient levels of cropland
for the immediate future.
Nevertheless, many of the concerns raised by the NALS study remain real
today. Indeed, a recent and comprehensive study by the American Farmland Trust
(AFf) confirmed the continuing loss of farmland and its potential consequences.
Entitled ''Farming on the Edge,"31 the study primarily focused on the "geographic
relationship between high quality farmland and development pressure."32 To do
this, the AFT examined conversion patterns for the years 1982-1992, using a
"Geographic Information System" database largely based on the Department of
Agriculture's National Resources Inventory. The study further analyzed
conversion patterns and development pressures within each of the nation's 181
Major Land Resource Areas (MLRAs), geographic regions defined by the USDA
as having homogenous characteristics relevant to farming.33
Not surprisingly, the AFT study found that every state lost some of its best
farmland to urban development during that period.34 This included four million
acres of "prime" farmland that were converted to more intensive land uses.35
More importantly, however, the study showed that a substantial amount of the
country's best farmland was under significant development pressure. Seventy
percent of the nation's :tv1LRAs had high quality farmland in proximity to
(summarizing critiques of NALS, especially that of William Fischel, and responses to the
critiques); see, generally, JOHN BADEN, THE VANISHING FARMLAND CRISIS: CRIIlCAL VIEWS
OF TIIE MOVEMENT TO PREsERVE AGRICULTIJRAL LAND (1984) (containing nine essays critical
ofthe NALS study); Fischel, supra note 3.
28 Urban Land Institute, supra note 3, at 240 (reviewing various criticisms of the NALS
study and challenges to the data).
29 See id. at 244-48; Delogu, supra note 3, at 530-33.
30 See Church, supra note 5, at 538--40.
31 SORENSEN Er AL., supra note 1.
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id. at 4-7. These characteristics include ''homogeneous patterns of soil, climate, water
resources, land use and type of farming." Id. at 6. MLRAs are typically comprised of several
million acres. See id. at 7.
34 See id. at 5.
35 See id. at 18.
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significant development pressure.36 The mapping system showed a significant
portion of the nation's high quality farmland as "threatened," which it defined as
"concentrations of prime and/or unique farmland coinciding with the state's most
rapidly developing area(s)."37 This in part reflects that much of the nation's best
farmland is near metropolitan areas, but the study also noted that migration back
into more rural communities is having a significant impact.38
As did the earlier NALS study, the AFf's study raises concerns about the
long-term consequences of conversion. Under what it labeled its ''worst case
scenario," which it acknowledged might never materialize, the United States
would become a net importer of food within sixty years.39 Of more immediate
concern was the loss of the current environmental benefits of farmland, such as
"open space, wildlife habitat, [and] groundwater recharge."40 It also noted that
loss of prime farmland is often replaced with less suitable land, resulting in
environmental damage by clearing forests or draining wetlands, and increased
erosion rates.41 Although the study recognized that development is necessary, the
significant and irreversible loss of the benefits of prime farmland made it
important that development be directed toward land less suited for high quality
agricultural use.42 The study concluded with an extensive set of recommendations
directed at generating additional research and information, strengthening federal
preservation efforts, and promoting state and local programs to preserve farmland,
especially in those states having land in the top twenty threatened MLRAs.43
36 See id. at 2, 5-8. For purposes of the study, the AFr included within the category of
''high quality farmland" both the USDA's category of "prime" fannland and AFf's own
definition of"unique" fannland. The USDA's ''prime" fannland designation is "defined as land
most suitable for producing food, feed, forage, fiber and oilseed crops." Id. at 5. To be classified
as ''prime," land must meet a number of specified criteria, including adequate moisture supply,
acceptable acidity, acceptable salt/sodium content, limited flooding, acceptable water tables,
and acceptable slope ranges. See id. at Glossary (citing USDA-SCS, 1982 NRI). The AFr's
''unique" farmland designation was fannland other than ''prime" fannland that was ''used for
the production ofspecific high-value food and fiber crops[,]" such as vegetables, grapes, fiuits,
nuts, and berries and which therefore had ''unique soil and climatic requirements." Id.
3? Id. at 4.
38 See id. at 5.
39 See id. at 2. The study in fact based this ''worst case scenario" ofbeing a net importer of
food within sixty years on conclusions offered at a press conference by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the nation's leading scientific
association, at its 1996 annual meeting. See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24 n.1 (citing
PRESS CONFERENCE: New Views on Consumption, Population and the Environment, AMERICAN
Assoc. FOR 1HEADVANCEMENTOF SCIENCE, ANNuALMEETING, Feb. 9, 1996).
40' SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
41 See id. at 19.
42 See id. at 18.
43 See id. at 21-23. The top twenty MLRAs, from highest to lowest scores, are:
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys; Northern Piedmont (primarily parts of Maryland, New

1999]

FARMLAND PRESERVATION

1041

B.RationalesforPreservation
Although a variety of reasons have been given for wanting to preserve
farmland from current conversion rates, they generally can be placed in two
groups: "food security" concerns and environmental benefits.44 "Food security''45
is the idea that farmland conversion threatens our long-term ability to produce
sufficient amounts of food to either feed ourselves or respond to future global
needs. This was first identified as a significant concern in the NALS study, which
raised significant issues regarding the long-term ability of the United States to
produce food.46 It has subsequently found its way into various efforts to preserve
farmland, including being articulated as a major rationale in enacting the federal
Farmland Protection Policy Act of 198147 and some state farmland protection
legislation.48
The food security issue has been the focus of intense debate during the last
two decades. While several recent analyses have noted it as a continuing
concern,49 other commentators have suggested that there is little risk that our
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); Southern Wisconsin and Northern Illinois Drift Plain;
Texas Blackland Prairie (eastern Texas); Willamette and Puget Sound Valleys (western Oregon
and Washington); Florida Everglades; Eastern Ohio Till Plain; Lower Rio Grande Plain; Mid
Atlantic Coastal Plain (primarily parts ofDelaware and Maryland); New England and Eastern
New York Upland, Southern Part; Ontario Plain and Finger Lakes (western New York);
Nashville Basin (Tennessee); Central Snake River Plains (parts of Idaho); Southwestern
Michigan Fruit and Truck Belt; Central California Coastal Valleys; Columbia Basin (primarily
parts of Washington); Imperial Valley (southern California); Long Island-Cape Cod Coastal
Lowland; Connecticut Valley (primarily parts of Connecticut and Massachusetts); Western
Michigan Fruit and Truck Belt. See id. at 8-17.
44 See Libby, supra note 3, at 426-29 (characterizing the two basic types ofrationales for
farmland preservation as ''food security'' and ''non-owner services offarmland").
45 I borrow the term "food security'' from Professor Libby. See id. at 426. Others have also
used it. See, e.g., Tweeten, supra note 3, at 247.
46 See NALS, supra note 3, at 56-62. The NALS noted numerous uncertainties in
projecting the ability to meet food demands in the future, including improving crop yields
through possible technological innovations and improved management practices, affecting both
future domestic and international needs.
47 See Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a) (1994) (stating that farmland
conversion "may threaten the ability ofthe United States to produce food and fiber in sufficient
quantities to meet domestic needs and the demands ofour export markets").
48 See Illinois Farmland Preservation Act, 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/2 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1999) (stating that farmland conversion "reduces future food production capability and
may ultimately undermine agriculture as a major economic activity in Illinois"). A number of
states have also passed Executive Orders aimed at preserving farmland, typically citing food
security concerns as one rationale for the order. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 01917 (1981);
Mich. Exec. Directive No. 1986-2 (1986).
49 See generally David Pimentel et. al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Soil
Erosion and Conservation Benefits, 267 SCIENCE 1117 (1995) (analyzing world-wide rates of
soil erosion and stating that it poses a major threat to the ability ofthe world to feed itselfin the
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country will be unable to feed itself no matter how much conversion rakes
place.so The food security argument can be quite nuanced, however, and ta1ce
various fonns.51 As noted by Professor Frank Church, "even if the country did
begin to reach its full cropland capacity, the consequences would not be
immediate starvation but only a gradual increase in the price of food relative to
other prices."52 He also notes that we have a cushion if a food security problem
begins to arise, including simplifying our diets, spending a higher percentage of
our wealth on food, and cutting back on exports. He concludes that "[a]lthough a
serious problem may never materialize, the possibility of a problem justifies at
least some concern."53 Thus, although our domestic food supply might not be
realistically threatened, we might be at risk of not being as competitive in
international markets or as responsive as we might be to a food crisis elsewhere.54
Though food will remain available, it will cost more and thus impose other costs
future); Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Fannland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. '137
(1998); David Pimentel & Marci Pimentel, U.S. Food Production Threatened by Rapid
Population Growth, (last modified Oct. 30, 1997) <http://www.enviroweb.org/gaia
pc/Pimentel2.html>.
SO See Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Fannland Preservation and Ecological
Footprints: A Critique (visited Aug. 21, 1999) <http://www-pam.usc.edu/v1i1a2sl .html>
(discussing theory of two University of Southern California economists who challenge
assumptions behind food security concerns and question the need to preserve farmland).
51 For an excellent and in-depth analysis ofthe food security issue as ofa decade ago, see
generally Church, supra note 5. Professor Church notes that as ofthe mid-1980s ''the domestic
and worldwide supply of food considerably exceed[ed] the demand," with Americans still
having millions ofacres ofpotential cropland in reserve. Whether a future food problem would
exist depends both on "future supply and demand of food here and abroad and on the future
supply ofAmerican farmland to produce that food." Id. at 522. He then proceeds to analyze the
various factors in-depth, examining national and world population trends, changing nutritional
standards, projected world food production, anticipated export demands for United States food,
and possible farmland conversion scenarios in the United States. See id. at 522-41. After an in
depth analysis of these factors, Church states that "[t]he untidy truth is simply that no one can
be sure whether a farmland preservation problem will arise or not." Id. at 541.
52 Id. at 542.
53 Id. at 543.
54 See Tweeten, supra note 3, at 240-50. Professor Tweeten's article analyzes a number of
factors that impact food security projections for the future, including the magnitude and sources
offarmland losses, historic global yield trends for five major crops, and future demand for food
based on population and global income projections. From a rather sophisticated analysis he
concludes that ''the future global food supply and demand balance" will be tighter than what we
have experienced since World War II. Id. at 247. He notes, however, that this ,vill primarily
threaten poor nations, and does not suggest food shortages in the United States. He indicates
that food prices will rise in this country, but since food prices are only a small portion of our
income in this country, it will not have a major impact on most people, though p0SS1oly some
effect on low-income people. See id. at 247-48. It will potentially have a major effect globally,
however, and Professor Tweeten suggests the need for national and international responses at
this time. See id. at 248-49.
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on future generations. Moreover, our ability to respond in a hwnanitarian fashion
to food crises elsewhere might be compromised, bringing a moral dimension to
the debate.55
Needless to say, the food security issue is neither clearcut nor singularly
compelling at this point. Although the long-range future is always hard to predict,
any food security concerns are very uncertain at best.56 Nonetheless, there are
certainly some attenuated long-tenn food issues for farmland preservation, and it
continues to be a stated rationale for regulatory efforts.57 Moreover, the
irreversible nature of farmland conversion, together with potential time lags for
appropriate market responses, suggest it is prudent to err on the side of caution in
this area.58
The second general type of rationale behind farmland preservation concerns a
variety of what might loosely be termed as "environmental benefits" from
farmland preservation. As noted by the AFf study and various commentators,
farmland provides a nwnber of benefits for society, including groundwater
recharge, control of stormwater runoff, wildlife habitat, and open-space
preservation.59 Moreover, preservation of prime farmland avoids environmental
costs often associated with shifting rangeland and forestland to the cropland base.
This might include increased erosion rates, loss of forests, and increased water
usage.60
Particularly important to some are the aesthetic and open space benefits
provided by farmland preservation. The open space provided by farmland near
55 The NALS study suggested this as one additional concern in evaluating our ability to
respond to future international food needs, noting in particular that future increases in food
production costs might make solutions to international food shortages more difficult. See
NALS, supra note 3, at 61-62; see also MALONE, supra note 27, § 6.03 (noting the argument
that farmland preservation is necessaiy to maintain adequate worldwide food supplies in
future).
56 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 541-43.
57 See, e.g., Farmland Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a) (1994); Illinois Farmland
Preservation Act, 505 Ill. Comp. Stat 75/2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
58 Larry Libby makes this point well, noting that the "food security'' issue is really about
"risk management over time." Libby, supra note 3, at 427. He recognizes there is substantial
uncertainty regarding our future ability to meet food needs, but that most current projections are
"sanguine" about our food production capacity until about 2050. See id. He notes that this is
based on several assumptions, including retention of some of the "most highly productive land
in farms[,]" continued management and technological advances, and the ability to convert other
lands (such as pasture and range) to productive farmland. Id. However, from a risk management
perspective, he concludes that the consequences of preserving more farmland than needed are
less severe than the consequences ofnot preserving enough. See id. at 427-28; see also Church,
supra note 5, at 543 ("[a]lthough a serious problem may never materialize, the posstbility of a
problem justifies at least some present concern'').
59 See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 19-20; see also Libby, supra note 3, at 429;
Tweeten, supra note 3, at 237-38.
60 See SORENSEN ET AL.,supranote I, at 19.

1044

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

residential development provides aesthetic relief from the intense development
that surrmmds residents, and often serves as a buffer between development and
other sensitive land uses.6 1 Preservation of farmland in proximity to development
can also be an important reminder of our nation's heritage.
Finally, farmland preservation can also be seen as an important growth
control measure helping to counter the effects of suburban sprawl. By preserving
high quality farmland near the urban fringe, it necessarily limits the more
scattered type of development that characterizes suburban sprawl. Not only does
such sprawl threaten prime farmland, but it also imposes substantial infrastructure
costs.62 Scatter development also creates lengthier response time in terms of fire
and police protection, and greater financial costs to serve such areas.63 Thus, a
benefit of farmland preservation is to facilitate growth management and decrease
various societal costs associated with scatter development.
Proponents of farmland preservation do not suggest that the above rationales
justify stopping all conversion. Most recognize that some conversion is inevitable
and necessary to address other societal needs, most notably housing.64 Ideally,
conversion would occur when farmland is better suited for alternative uses, and
would not occur when the benefits of preservation outweigh those of conversion.
The concern, however, is that our best farmland is being converted at too fast a
rate and broader societal concerns are not being adequately considered.
It might be argued, of course, that the market itself is the best avenue to
allocate land uses and that the current conversion rate simply reflects societal
preferences for land in its alternative, nonagricultural use.65 The problem is that
the market fails to consider all the costs and benefits in the transaction-they are
external to the decisionmaking process. Thus, even if society is clearly better off
in some instances by preserving farmland rather than converting it to alternative,
nonagricultural uses, most of the benefits from preservation go to the broader
public and not to the immediate parties involved. From the perspective of the

&

61 See id. at 20; Sean F. Nolon Cozata Solloway, Comment, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACEL. REY. 591, 594-95
(1997).
6Z See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
63 A recent study prepared for the Center for Agriculture in the Environment, a branch of
the American Farmland Trust, found that large lot, scatter development-the type most
frequently threatening to prime farmland-imposed increased financial costs for infrastructure
and also caused significant response time for police and fire protection. See J. Dixon Esseks, et
al., Fiscal Costs and Public Safety Risks of Low-Density Residential Development on
Fann/and: Findz"ngs .from Three Diverse Locations on the Urban Fringe of the Chicago
Metropolitan Area (last modified Jan. 1999) <http://farm.fic.niu.edu/cae/wp/98-1/wp98l.html>.
64 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 553.
6S Similarly, the argument has been made that even if a farmland conversion problem
arises, the market, through its pricing mechanisms, will itself move to protect farmland ,vithout
the need for government intervention. See Delogu, supra note 3, at 523-33.
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landowner considering an attractive offer to sell, the immediate benefits from
conversion are almost always greater. It is this concern that legitimizes
government intervention to control conversion, at least in some instances. The
next section of this Article briefly overviews some of the basic farmland
preservation techniques that have been used.

C. Farmland Preservation Techniques
fu response to the growing perception that farmland conversion is a
significant societal problem, and given additional impetus by the 1981 NALS
study, state and local governments have adopted a variety of techniques to
encourage the preservation of farmland. The NALS study identified several basic
types of programs which continue to form the basis for local and state
preservation efforts today.66 1bis Article does not give a comprehensive
discussion of these programs, which has been done elsewhere,67 but instead
briefly summarizes the most common alternatives.
One of the earliest and most common techniques for farmland preservation is
state programs providing various types of tax-relief to owners of agricultural
land.68 Today all fifty states have some form of tax relief provisions for
agricultural land.69 The most common of these are preferential-assessment
statutes, which assess land at a reduced value when used for agriculture70 and
deferred taxation programs,71 which provide lower assessment for farmland but
66 See NALS, supra note 3, at 63-75.
67 See generally, e.g., Church, supra note 5; Robert E. Coughlin & John C. Keene, The
Protection ofFann/and: An Analysis of Various State and Local Approaches, 33 LAND USEL.
& ZONJNG DIGEST, 5 (1981); Juergensmeyer, supra note 8; Teri E. Pope, A Survey of
Governmental Response to the Fann/and Crisis: States' Application ofAgricultural Zoning, I I
U. ARK. LITILE ROCK LJ. 515 (1988-1989); Jerome G. Rose, Fann/and Preservation Policy
and Programs, 24 NAT. REsOURCES J. 591 (1984). For a recent examination of how several
different strategies have been applied in concrete situations, see White, supra note 7.
68 For a general discussion of differential tax programs for fannland, see generally Barry
A. Cunier, An Analysis ofDifferential Taxation as a Method ofMaintaining Agricultural and
Open Space Land Uses, 30 U. FLA. L. REY. 821 (1978); Juergensmeyer, supra note 8, at 46670.
69 See American Fannland Trust, State Fann/andProtection Statutes by Category (!'able)
(visited Oct 30, 1999) <http://fann.fic.niu.edu/fic/Jaws/fpkeytab.html> (categorizing all 50
state statutes).
70 See, e.g., ARiz. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-12004, 42-15004 (West 1999); COLO. REY.
STAT. ANN.§§ 39-1-102 to 103 (1998); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 48-5-7 to 7.5 (1999); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 441.21 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 273.111 (West 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE§§ 57-02-27 to 27.2 (1983 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE§ ll-lA-10 (1995 &
Supp. 1999).
71 See, e.g., ALA. CoDE§§ 40-7-25 to 25.3 (1993 & Supp. 1998); 35 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. 200/10-110 to 147 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REY. STAT. §§ 77-1343 to
1363(1996 & Supp. 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN.§§ 54:4-23.1 to 2321 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999);
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require partial or total repayment of tax savings if the land is later converted to
other uses. The obvious purpose ofboth types oflegislation is to provide :financial
incentives for farmers to offset the :financial pressures posed by conversion.
A second type offarmland preservation program, also found in all fifty states,
are right-to-farm laws.72 These statutes provide farmers protection against certain
nuisance actions, typically in "coming to the nuisance" situations, where
development has moved out to agricultural areas and created conflicting uses.73
Slightly less than halfthe states also provide protection against local government
efforts to zone out existing agricultural uses, again typically in "coming to the
nuisance" scenarios.74 They do not permit expansion ofexisting uses, but provide
protection for the level of agricultural activity in existence when development
arrived. These right-to-farm statutes do not guarantee preservation, but provide
protection to farmers who desire to continue farming in the face of approaching
development.
A third and less common type of preservation program is agricultural
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5713.34 (Anderson 1999); s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 12-43-220 to 232
(Law. Co-op. 1977 &Supp. 1998).
72 For a general discussion of right-to-farm laws, see generally Keith Burgess-Jackson,
The Ethics and Economics ofRight-To-Fann Statutes, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481 (1986);
Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-To-Fann Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of
Fann/and, 45 U. Pm. L. REv. 289 (1984); Edward Thompson, Jr., Right-To-Fann Laws, in
1983 ZONING AND PL. L. HANDBOOK 207 (Fredric A. Strom, ed.). For recent criticisms of right
to-farm laws, see generally Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Jann Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons
Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. OF
AGRIC. L. 103 (1998); Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right-To-Farm: Hog-Tied and
Nuisance Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1694 (1998).
73 See, e.g.,ALA. CODE§ 6-5-127 (1993 &Supp. 1998);ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-111
to 112 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 1999); 740 ILL
COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 to 5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-4 (West
1983 & Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.295 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE
§§ 19-19-1 to 5 (1997 & Supp. 1999). Judicial interpretation of right-to-farm laws has been
limited, although in a few cases courts have found them to be applicable and to bar nuisance
actions. See generally Laux v. Chopin Land Associates, 550 N.E2d 100 (Ind. Ct App. 1990)
(discussing what constitutes "changed conditions" for nuisance actions); Steffens v. Keeler, 503
N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (barring a nuisance claim because
evidence did not show the change of agricultural area to a residential area). In a recent case,
however, Bormann v. Board ofSupervisors for Kossuth County, 584 N.W2d 309 (Iowa 1998),
the Iowa Supreme Court held that the nuisance immunity provision found in Iowa's agricultural
land preservation statute constituted a taking of neighbors' property rights and was therefore
unconstitutional. See id. at 321.
14 See, e.g., CAL. CN. CODE §§ 3482.5 to .6 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REv.
STAT.§§ 35-3.5-101 to 103 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 42-04-01 to 05 (1983 &Supp. 1999);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1998); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 951- 957 (West 1995 &Supp. 1999); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 46-45-lOto 60 (Law. Co-op. 1987
&Supp. 1998); TEx. AGRIC. CODEANN. §§ 251.001-251.006 (West 1982 &Supp. 1999); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 823.08 (West 1994 &Supp. 1998).
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districting.75 Currently recognized in approximately fifteen states,76 agricultural
districting involves the vohmtary creation of special agricultural districts, which
require that the land be used for agricultural purposes. Districts are established for
a limited period of time, such as five to ten years, which can then be renewed. In
exchange for the requirement that the land stay agricultural, landowners receive a
number of benefits, depending on the particular authorizing statute. Some are
similar to benefits conferred by other statutes, such as differential tax assessments
and right-to-farm provisions. Others are more unique to the district, and might
include PDR provisions, limitations on the exercise of eminent domain against
farm property, and restrictions on special assessments and government
annexations.77
As noted by various commentators, the voluntary nature of all of the above
programs significantly limit their effectiveness.78 Right-to-farm laws are only
effective in preventing involuntary conversion against a landowner's wishes; they
provide little basis to preserve fannland when a farmer desires to convert.
Although tax incentives and agricultural districting can both provide some
temporacy relief from conversion pressures, neither is sufficient to offset the
:financial incentive of conversion when significant development pressure exists.79
Indeed, in some instances they simply help subsidize fannland while waiting for
development Such programs play an important role in a comprehensive
preservation program, but by themselves will often be ineffective in establishing
long-term fannland preservation.
For that reason, effective fannland preservation programs will need to restrict
a landowner's ability to convert by relying on techniques that place
decisionmak:ing authority elsewhere, most notably the government. The most
common and least expensive way this can be done is by some type of public
restriction placed on the land, typically in the fonn of agricultural zoning.
Fourteen states currently have statutes which specifically address and authorize
75 For discussions of agricultural districting, see MALONE, supra note 27, at § 6.09;
Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67, at 6-7; White, supra note 7, at 124-135.
76 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3 §§ 901-930 (1993 & Supp. 1998); 505 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/1 to 203 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 352.1 to 352.12 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999); KY. REY. STAT. ANN.§ 262.850 {Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE
ANN., AGRIC.§§ 2-501 to 516 (1999); MA.ss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 132A,§ 1 lA (Law. Co-op.
1989 & Lexis Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473 H.01-473 H.18 (West 1994 & Supp.
1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:IC-1 to 55 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); Omo REY. CODE ANN.
§§ 929.01 to .05 (Anderson 1988 & Supp. 1999); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§§ 901-915 (West
1995 & Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 43-34-101 to 108 (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 17-41-101 to 406.(1995 & Supp. 1999).
77 See MALONE, supra note 27, at§ 6.09[1]; REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 103.
78 See, e.g., Church, supra note 5, at 547-51; Wadley, supranote 5, at 493.
19 See REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 96-97; Church, supra note 5, at 550-51;
Juergensmeyer, supra note 8, at 466-67.
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particular forms of "agricultural protection zoning,"80 but as a practical matter
agricultural zoning clearly falls within local government's general zoning power,
even in the absence of a special statute. Because it can preclude conversion of
farmland even when significant :financial incentives exist, zoning is a widely and
increasingly used farmland preservation technique at the local government level.
Agricultural zoning can take several basic forms.Bl On the one hand, local
governments can impose what is often referred to as "exclusive agricultural
zoning,"82 which prohibits any use other than agricultural. Even this type of
zoning will permit certain compatible or accessory buildings, such as barns, on
the property; :fundamentally, however, exclusive agricultural zoning is designed
to limit the property to agricultural use only.
A more common approach to agricultural zoning is to permit non-farm uses,
most notably residential, but in effect to establish agricultural restrictions through
severe density limitations. This is often done through large minimum-lot size
requirements, where the minimum lot size typically corresponds to "the minimum
size of commercial farms . .. in the area."83 Thus, minimum lot sizes might range
from one house per 40 acres to one house per 160 acres. The obvious effect is to
limit the property to agricultural use. Agricultural zoning might also impose
density restrictions but permit small lot "clustering"ofactual development on the
property.8 4 This permits a greater overall density level, such as one· dwelling per
ten acres, but leaves a significant area ofland to be completely free for farming.
Whatever its form, agricultural zoning serves the purpose of significantly
limiting development on farmland property, thus preserving the property's
farmland status. hnportantly, by placing public restrictions on the property the
landowner is not free to sell the land for nonagricultural use when development
pressure and attendant :financial incentives become great. The result is to place the
cost of preservation as reflected in diminution in land value on the restricted
landowner.
In contrast, two other preservation techniques, Purchase of Development
Rights programs and Transferrable Development Rights programs, limit a
landowner's ability to convert, but do so by shifting the cost ofpreservation to the
SO See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT.ANN. § 9-462.01 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE
ANN. § 36-7-4-601 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.187 (Michie 1993
& Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 39425 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 19-903 to 916 (1997); OR.REv. STAT. § 215.203 (1991 & Supp. 1998); 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN.§§ 10601-10608 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4496 (1992
& Supp. 1998).
Bl For discussion of the variations in agricultural zoning, see MALONE, supra note 27,
§ 6.08 (discussing differentforms that agricultural zoning can take); Juergensmeyer, supra note
8, at451-55 (same).
82 See MALoNE, supra note 27, § 6.08[3].
83 Id. § 6.08[2][a].
84 See id. § 6.08[2][b].
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public. In a PDR program, the government typically will buy the development
rights on fannland, paying the landowner the difference between the property's
value if more intensive development is allowed and its value if limited to
agricultural use.85 The property can no longer be converted to more intense,
nonagricultural use, since the development rights have been transferred
elsewhere, yet the cost of preservation is borne by the public through the purchase
agreement.86
Like PDR programs, IDR programs give restricted property owners
compensation for loss of development rights, but instead of cash landowners are
given development rights that can be transferred elsewhere.87 The transferred
rights can be used to exceed applicable restrictions in identified "receiving areas,"
thus providing a benefit to the landowner. In effect, the IDRs involve a shifting
of potential development from one area to another, with the result that farmland is
preserved. Moreover, most IDR programs pennit the IDRs to be sold to other
landowners with eligible property, providing a source of income to the restricted
property owners. Although IDRs might fimction in a voluntruy setting, they more
typically are provided in conjunction with mandatory zoning schemes to offset
the burden of preservation.88
PDR and IDR programs are attractive in that they shift the cost to the public,

85 For

discussions ofthe use of conservation easements and PDR programs to preserve
farmland, see generally MAI.oNE, supra note 27, at §6.11; Vivian Quinn, Preserving Fann/and
with Conservation Easements: Public Benefit or Burden?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV.AM.L. 235.
86 A number of states have statutes specifically authorizing PDR programs. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REv.STAT. ANN. §§9-464.01 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998), 11-935.01 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1998); CAL.PuB. REv.CODE §§10200 to 10277 (West 1996 & Supp.1999); CONN.
GEN.STAT.ANN.§§22-26aa to 26.ii (West 1985 & Supp.1999); DEL.CODE ANN.tit 3 §§901
to 930 (1993 & Supp.1998); KY.REv. STAT.ANN. §§262.900 to 920 (Michie 1994 & Supp.
1998); ME.REv.STAT. ANN. tit.5, §§6200-6210 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); N.H.REv. STAT.
ANN.§§432:18 to 432:3la (1991 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§4:lC-1 to 55 (West 1998
& Supp. 1999); 3 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN.§§901 to 915 (West 1995 & Supp.1999); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, §§4301 to 4495 (1992 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REv.CODE ANN.§§8434.010 to
.925 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); W.VA. CODE §§8-24-72 to 78 (1998 & Supp.1999).
87 The literature on IDRs is voluminous.See generally oJ hn J.Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALELJ. 75 (I 973); Julian Conrad uJ ergensmeyer,
et al., Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB.LAW 441
(I 998); Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Wei/
Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 867 (1984). Several states have passed statutes
specifically authorizing IDR programs. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.ANN. § 1633202 (West 1990 &
Supp.1999); KY.REv. STAT. ANN. § 100208 (Michie 1993 & Supp.1998); N.J.STAT.ANN.
§§4:lC-l to 55 (West 1998 & Supp.1999); N.Y.GEN. CilYLAW §20-f(McKinney Supp.
1999); TENN.CODE ANN.§ 13-7-101 (1992 & Supp. 1998); VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 24, §§43014496 (1992 & Supp.1998).
88 See White, supra note 7, at 135-40 (descn'bing IDR programs for farmland
preservation).

1050

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

thus arguably appearing more fair.89 Moreover, both programs are possibly less
susceptible to the shifting political climate often affecting zoning, where deviation
from initial zoning designation often and easily occurs in the face of development
pressure. Yet the cost of PDR programs make them unrealistic for widespread
use, especially in a time of fiscal restraint for most local governments. TDR
programs avoid this problem by providing development rights instead of money,
but are contingent upon the right mix of ingredients, including appropriate
"receiving areas" to succeed. In particular, there must be significant enough land
use restrictions in place to make the TDRs worth something, along with
conditions suitable to absorb the transferred development90 Further, TDR
programs require the stability of zoning restrictions so that the value ofTDRs are
not undermined-a relatively rare occurrence.9 1 For these reasons, few successful
TDR programs have emerged and their promise as a fannland preservation tool is
limited.92
Although TDR and in particular PDR programs certainly have a role to play
in comprehensive fannland preservation programs, their potential is limited. For
this reason, any comprehensive effort must rely on agricultural zoning or other
forms of public land use restrictions. This is best done through a comprehensive
planning process, in which the need to preserve fannland can be appropriately
viewed in the context of other, and at times, competing societal needs, including
affordable housing. The end result, however, will necessarily be restrictions on
some owners' rights to convert to more intensive development, often at a
significant financial cost to the affected landowner.
Despite the central role that zoning must play in fannland preservation, it is
subject to two common and closely related challenges. The first of these is that
the imposition of zoning restrictions to preserve fannland constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property, especially when it results in significant
diminution in value to the affected landowner. Second, even if not a taking, a
growing number of property owners perceive such restrictions as unfair where the
cost of preservation is placed on landowners instead of the public as a whole. The
next two sections of this Article will address each of these arguments in turn.

89 See, e.g., Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67, at 9 (suggesting in some situations PDRs
more fair than agricultural zoning); Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 444 (suggesting
TDR programs more fair than zoning in some cases); Lazarus, supra note 12, at 731-32
(suggesting TDR programs are a way to address the legitimate fairness issues that sometimes
arise).
90 See Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 446-48 (describing how TDR system
works); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion
ofEnvironmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVIL. AFF. L. REY.
565, 574-79 (1992) (discussing difficulties in establishing successful TDR program)
91 See Juergensmeyer et al., supra note 87, at 447-48; Kayden, supra note 90, at 578.
92 See Kayden, supra note 90, at 576-77 (discussing limited success ofTDR programs).
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III. TAKINGS AND AGRICULTURAL ZONING
As noted above, an initial issue with public controls on fannland, and in
particular agricultural zoning, is whether they constitute an unconstitutional
taking of property. This is a frequent argument made by mvners of agricultural
land when they are forced to forego substantial appreciated value that conversion
to a nonagricultural use would bring. They perceive the often substantial
diminution in value as compared to alternative uses as a taking of property, both
because of the lost economic value and the interference with perceived property
rights. This part of the Article first analyzes such takings claims under current
United States Supreme Court doctrine and then reviews how lower courts have
addressed the issue.93

A Supreme Court Takings Doctrine
The Supreme Court's takings analysis has gone through a long, and at times,
tortuous path and still remains far from clear.94 The Court first recognized the
concept of a regulatory taking in its seminal decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,95 in which it struck dmvn a state statute that had the effect of requiring
coal companies to keep a portion of coal in the ground to avoid subsidence
damage to surface structures.96 Although the Court acknowledged that
government could not go on if it had to pay every time its regulations reduced the
value of land, it stated that "if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.''97 The Court concluded that the statute had "gone too far" and constituted
a taking, but failed to explain its conclusion other than to state that the statute

93 For other discussions of whether agricultural zoning constitutes ata1cing,see REDFIELD,
supra note 5, at 20--44; Sam Sheronick, Note, The Accretion of Cement and Steel onto Prime
Iowa Fann/and: A Proposalfor a Comprehensive State Agricultural Zoning Plan, 76 IOWA L.
REv. 583, 598-604 (1991).
94 Commentators have frequently noted the less than clear state of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 514 (2d ed.
I 993) (stating a lack of consistent standards has led to confusion); J. Peter Byrne, Ten
Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 EcOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102
(I 995) (descnbing the jurisprudence as "an unworkable muddle ''); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the
Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Fonnulate
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307,308 (1998) ("[i]ncoherence ...has by
now been demonstrated time and again ....''); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark:
hzvestment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH.
L. REv. 91, 92 (1995) (''Regulatoryta1cings are proving to be one of the enduring dilemmas of
the twentieth century.'').
95 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
96 See id. at 412-13,416.
97 Id. at 415.

1052

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

made the mining of anthracite coal "commercially impracticable."98
Although the precise holding ofPennsylvania Coal is subject to some debate,
it clearly established that the mere regulation of property for otherwise legitimate
purposes might constitute a taking if the economic impact is too severe.99 The
Court gave little guidance, however, as to when that point is reached. It suggested
that diminution in value might be a factor, but failed to clarify how that is
determined other than stating when diminution reaches a "certain magnitude" a
taking occurs.IOO Despite this language, in the years subsequent to Pennsylvania
Coal the Court has consistently rejected takings challenges on the basis of
economic impact alone. Indeed, after Pennsylvania Coal the Court never found a
taking based solely upon economic impact until its recent decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,101 which involved a rather extreme fact
situation. Rather, the Court has often upheld restrictions on land-use restrictions
despite substantial diminution in value.102
The leading case typifying the Court's takings jurisprudence during this
period was Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,103 where it upheld
the validity of New York City's Landmark Pres.ervation Law against a takings
challenge. In that case, New York City, pursuant to its Landmark Preservation
Law, had designated Grand Central Terminal, owned by Penn Central, as a
"landmark."104 This meant that a Landmark Preservation Commission
("Commission") had to approve any exterior changes to the building, even if they
were consistent with applicable zoning regulations.105 Penn Central sought
approval of two alternative plans to build either a fifty-three story or fifty-five
story addition to the building, both of which met current zoning requirements.106
The Commission rejected both plans on grounds that they would aesthetically
denigrate the landmark,107 in effect eliminating or greatly reducing the previously
existing and quite valuable air rights that Penn Central had. Penn Central then
challenged the application of the law as a taking.I08
In analyzing the validity of the Landmark Preservation Law, the Supreme
Court began by noting that there was no clear formula for a takings analysis, but it
98 Id. at 414.
99 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127--28 (1978).
100 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
101 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
102 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75%
diminution in value).
103 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
104 See id. at 115-16.
105 See id. at 112.
106 See id. at 116-17.
107 See id. at 117-18.
108 See id. at 119.
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instead addressed takings claims on an ad hoc basis.109 It then identified several
factors to detennine whether a taking occtnTed, including the nature of the
government action, the diminution in value, and most importantly, the degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations.1 10 On that basis, the Court held
that the Landmark Preservation Law did not constitute a taking as applied to Penn
Central's property, emphasizing that the regulation still permitted a "reasonable
return" on the land. I I I
Particularly significant to the Court in determining that the interference with
Penn Central's investment expectations did not constitute a taking was that the
Landmark Preservation Law did not prevent Penn Central from using the property
for its original purpose as purchased. Grand Central had been used for the
previous 65% as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions.112
For that reason the Landmark Preservation Law did not "interfere with what must
be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the
parceJ."113 Thus, even though the Landmark Preservation Law in effect
eliminated more intensive development previously permitted by its zoning, the
assurance of a reasonable return and continuation of previous uses that formed
earlier expectations negated any takings concerns.
The Court's most recent articulation of its takings analysis based on
economic impact comes from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,l l4 a
1992 decision which builds upon the earlier Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central
decisions. In Lucas, the plaintiff, David Lucas, owned two undeveloped beach
front lots which permitted residential development at the time he purchased the
property for $975,000.115 Subsequently a coastal preservation law was passed
which had the effect of prohibiting any development on the property.116 Lucas
challenged the restriction as a taking.117 The trial court found that the restriction
rendered the property ''valueless" and therefore constituted a taking.118 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that even if the regulation left the
property valueless, it was not a taking because of the important public interests
109 Seeid. at 124.

IIO Seeid.
111 Id. at 136.

112seeid.
113 See id.
114 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Two years after Lucas the Court decided another i ortant
mp
takings case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). That decision did not focus on
whether economic impact constituted a taking, however, but instead on the standard for
reviewing exactions imposed as part of the development process, a type of taking derivative of
the physical invasion line ofcases. Seeid. at 385.
115 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
116 Seeid. at 1006-07.
117 Seeid. at 1009.
118 Seeid.
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served.119
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that although
most takings inquiries are fact specific and ad hoc in nature, it had recognized two
types of categorical takings in its previous cases.120 In such instances, certain
supporting facts establish a taking without a need to balance the respective
interests involved.121 First are physical invasions, in which the government
invades or grants the right to other parties to intrude physically upon the property
in question.122 In such situations a taking is near automatic, no matter what the
economic impact of the government action.123
The second type of categorical taking is ''where the regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land."124 The Court noted that it
had recognized in a number of prior decisions that a taking occurs when a
regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."125 In justifying
this categorical taking, the Court noted that "in the extraordinary circumstance"
when land has lost all economic viability "it is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life. "'126 The Court did state that the loss of all economic viability
would not constitute a taking where the regulation is merely prolnbiting a
common law nuisance, since such land use was not part of the landowner's
property interest.127
In recognizing that the loss of economic viability constituted a categorical
taking, the Court was careful not to preclude the possibility of finding a taking
l l9 Id. at 1009-10.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 1015
122 See id.
123 See id. The Court had previously recognized physical invasions, even when minimal in
nature, as near per se takings. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (requiring landlords to permit cable companies to run cable wires on
property); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (illustrating navigation servitude
imposed on private marina); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (discussing a law
dealing with overhead flights).
124 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
125 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted). The Court in Agins had used the "economically viable" standard as
part of a two-part test for takings, stating that a regulation will be a taking if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land." Id. at 260 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 138 n36 (1977)) (citations
omitted). The Court used that same articulation ofthe takings standard in a series ofdecisions in
the 1980s. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Connn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981).
126 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124).
127 See id. at 1027-31.
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when a restriction reduces but does not altogether eliminate economic viability. In
a footnote, the Court noted that such a restriction might still constitute a taking
llllder the Court's ad hoc balancing test established in Penn Centraz.12s It did not
clearly define how such a test might operate, but did state that "'the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and ...the extent to which the regulation
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant''l29
to its general takings analysis.
Thus, in Lucas the Court established what might be viewed as a two-fold test
for analyzing whether the economic impact of a regulation constitutes a taking.
First, if the regulation leaves the property owner with no economic viability it is a
categorical taking, absent a finding that the prohibited use would have constituted
a common law nuisance. Second, even if some economic viability remains, a
court is to examine the economic impact and interference with investment-backed
expectations to determine if a taking is to be folllld. However, such analysis must
be made in the context of Penn Central, where the Court examined the ability of
continued use, as opposed to potential use, and the established nature of the use.
The above analysis suggests that agricultural zoning would rarely constitute a
taking llllder cmTent Supreme Court standards, even where it results in substantial
diminution in value. It is likely that farming ,vill be viewed as an economically
viable land use, precluding a finding of a categorical taking.130 Although the
Court has not clearly indicated how economic viability is determined,131 the
primary focus is not on what is lost in terms of potential profit, but what remains
in terms of possible use.132 As long as there is a reasonable ability to generate a
livelihood, there is economic viability. This would normally be the case with
farmland, where an agricultural zoning designation would typically permit
continuation of cmTent activities.
In this sense, farmland preservation can be distinguished from other types of
environmental land-use controls, such as restrictions designed to preserve
wetlands, coastal zones, and wildlife habitat.If such regulations are applied to the

128 See id. at 1019 n.8(quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
129 Id.
130Lower courts that have addressed the economic viability issue have consistently found

agricultural use as economically viable. See, e.g., Grand Land Co. v. Township of
Bethlehem,483 A2d 818, 820-21 (N.J. Super. Ct.App. Div. 1984); City ofVirginia Beach v.
VirginiaLandlnvestmentAss'n No. 1, 389 S.E2d 312, 314(Va. 1990).
131See Oswald, supra note 94, at 117-26.
132 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (stating
categorical taking for no economic viability applies "in the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use ofland is permitted''); see also Michael C. Blumm,
The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just
Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENvIL. L. 171, 175 (1995) (noting economic
viability standard applies only when there are no productive uses ofproperty remaining).
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totality of a landowner's property,133 they typically require that the property be
left in its natural state, as was the case in Lucas. This not only precludes
development, but greatly limits any realistic opporttmities for economic use.134 In
contrast, agricultural zoning, though prohibiting development, pennits
continuation of what had been the intended economic use of the property.
For similar reasons, agricultural zoning would not usually constitute a taking
under the Penn Central balancing test which focuses on interference with
investment-backed expectations. This is clearest where an agricultural limitation
has been in place prior to appreciated values and the affected landowner is now
seeking an ''upzoning'' to a more intensive use. Although refusal to upzone in
such a situation might result in significant loss of potential appreciated value for
the landowner, this can hardly be viewed as a significant interference with
investment-backed expectations. Even where the purchase price reflects the
potential for intensive development, this is speculation on a possible zoning
change and is certainly not the type of investment for which compensation should
be required.135
The issue is somewhat more problematic when property is "downzoned"
from more intensive use to agricultural, resulting in a substantial diminution in
value. Two different scenarios should be distinguished here. First, is where the
original investment in the property clearly reflects agricultural use and value, and
only later did the value greatly appreciate, probably due to subsequent
development in the vicinity of the regulated property. This might likely be where,
no matter what the original zoning designation at the time of purchase, the
property was economically best suited for agricultural use with no significant
development pressure. Subsequent to that purchase, the land gradually came
under development pressure, raising the value substantially.
Despite the substantial diminution in value such a scenario might cause, a
133 A critical issue in takings analysis is how the property being regulated is defined, often
known as the "denominator" issue. See Blumm, supra note 132, at 184; Frank I. Michelman,

Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1192 (1967). Although the Court in Lucas suggested there are
still questions regarding how the property is defined, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7, the

Court in other contexts has made clear that the relevant property is the parcel as a whole and not
just the segment being regulated. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 497-99 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978). Thus, if only half of the property is subject to an environmental restriction precluding
development, the economic impact should be assessed according to the economic viability of
the entire parcel. For this reason, significant takings concerns should arise only if environmental
restrictions apply to most or all of the property.
134 The Court in Lucas suggested that leaving property in its natural state was perhaps the
only clear instance in which property would be left with ''no economic viability." Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1018.
135 See John A. Rumbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REv. 339, 366-67
(1989); Oswald,supranote94, at 115--16.
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substantial interference with investment-backed expectations so as to constitute a
taking is unlikely. As in Penn Central, the original investment reflects the
permitted agricultural use; the downzoning only interferes with opportunities
subsequent to the investment. The lost appreciated value does not so much reflect
the investment of the landowner as a fortuitous windfall from advancing
development, much of it even created by government itself through provision of
infrastructure.136 Although downzoning in such a situation clearly has an
economic impact on the affected landowner, it likely does not amount to the
degree of interference ,vith investment-backed expectations contemplated by
Penn Central. Indeed, Penn Central itselfessentially involved this same scenario,
where what had been permitted development was eliminated, resulting in
significant economic impact, but not interfering with what had been the original
expectation of the property owner.137
More difficult is where property is purchased at a price reflecting permitted
development opportunities, which is then downzoned resulting in substantial
economic loss. In such situations, the landowner's development expectations are
arguably backed by the purchase price, and the diminution in value resulting from
downzoning is an interference so as to constitute a taking. Even here, however, it
is not certain whether the degree of interference constitutes a taking for several
reasons. To be implemented in the first place, zoning necessarily involves
downzoning from previous development opportunities, which inevitably will
affect some recently purchased property. Although never directly addressing the
issue, the Court in upholding various zoning schemes, including that in Penn
Central, has never suggested that an interference with purchase prices in this
manner would be unconstitutional.138 Indeed, the Court has never clearly
identified an interference ,vith investment-backed expectations that constitutes a
taking,139 while at the same time stating that diminution in value by itself does not
136 See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text
13? See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (stating there was no interference with investment
backed expectations because property could be used as it had been for the previous 65 years).
138 See id. (holding that New York City's Landmark Preservation Law was not a taking);
cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that zoning ordinance that limited
development did not constitute a taking); Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (denying the grant ofan injunction to prevent the enforcement ofa zoning ordinance).
139 The Court has explicitly or implicitly considered the issue of interference with
investment-backed expectations with regard to land-use regulations in several cases since Penn
Central, ,vithout ever finding a taking on that basis. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63 (1981);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987); see also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-96 (1981). It has also occasionally
analyzed the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations in regulatory contexts
other than land, such as regulation of pension fimds, in several cases saying the interference
with ell."})ectations did not constitute a taking. See Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 646-47 (1993); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-28 (1986).
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constitute a taking.140
Second, the Court and commentators have also recognized the notion of
"regulatory risk," a concept that helps inform the reasonableness of any
investment-backed expectations.The Supreme Court recognized this in Lucas,
where it stated, "[i]t seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the
use of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers .... "141This
builds on statements by the Court in other regulatory contexts, in which it has
strongly affirmed the idea that the risk of regulation is part of economic life,
which includes the distinct possibility of economic loss.142 The Court has noted
this is particularly true with regard to activities that "[have] long been the source
of public concern and the subject of government regulation."143 As noted by John
Rumbach, this certainly includes the land development field, which has long been
subject to government regulation and, if anything, the trend is toward greater
controls.144
Commentators have similarly recognized the concept of regulatory risk as
playing an important role in takings analysis.As noted by Frank Michelman,
In a case decided last tenn,however,Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 s.a. 2131 (1998) a
four person plurality of the Court found that a requirement under the Coal Act of 1992 that
required a company to pay the health care costs of retired workers employed by the company
before it stopped mining in 1965 was a taking under the Penn Central balancing test. See 118
s.a. 2131, 2131 (1998). In particular, the plurality found the Coal Act violated reasonable
investment-backed expectations, both because the distance it reached into the past posed
"substantial questions offaimess" and the nature ofthe government's past regulation at the time
Eastern conducted business could not have given the company posSible notice "that lifetime
health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades later." Id. at 2152. However,
Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, expressly rejected that analysis, stating that the takings
analysis was inapplicable to the regulation of pension assets. See id. at 2154-58. The four
dissenting Justices similarly rejected the application of the takings analysis to the facts of the
case. See id. at 2164-68. Thus,five ofthe Justices found the takings analysis inapplicable to the
facts of the case. Moreover,it should be emphasized that even to the extent the plurality found
an interference with investment-backed expectations under the takings clause,it was based on a
very extreme fact pattern,in which a substantial regulatory burden was imposed on a company
nearly three decades after it exited the industry,and the burden was of the type that could not
have been reasonably anticipated at the time it conducted business.
140 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
141Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,505 U.S. 1003,1027 (1992).
142 The Supreme Court has often stated that "[t]hose who do business in the regulated
field cannot object ifthe legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
the legislative end." FHA v. The Darlington,Inc.,358 U.S. 84,91 (1958); Concrete Pipe, 508
U.S. 602,645 (1993) (quoting Darlington); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,475 U.S.
211, 227 (1986) (quoting Darlington); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007
(1984) (stating that one must accept regulatory burdens as part of doing business); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,428 U.S. 1,15-16 (1976).
143 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007.
144See Rumbach,supra note 135,at 367--68.
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"regulation [is] an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity, against
which we all take our chances ... as investors in property."145 This includes the
risk that "government may tighten the applicable regulations,"146 leading to a
substantial loss in value from the purchase price. As a practical matter, purchase
prices should also be discounted by the possibility ofregulation. Thus, although
often recognizing that the notion of investment-backed expectations is circular
and extremely ambiguous, a number of commentators have argued persuasively
that the risk ofregulation, resulting in a possible diminution in value, is part of
reasonable landowner expectations in property.147
This is not to say that all state interference with land investment can be easily
dismissed on the basis that property owners should have foreseen that regulation
might occur, which is clearly inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
protection ofland investment is most reasonably expected, however, when based
on actual development expenditures rather than speculation on future uses.148
Where a landowner has actually spent money developing land, there is a strong
public policy that the landowner's expectations be protected, otherwise incentives
for the development of land, critical to our well-being, are jeopardized.149 But
where the investment is merely the purchase of land for future development,
expectations must be considered contingent at best. Although even here
interference with expectations might constitute a taking, it would need to be in the
context ofcompelling facts.
The above analysis suggests that in the majority of instances, reasonable
efforts at agricultural zoning should not constitute a taking, even when resulting in
145 Frank I. Michelman,A Skeptical Vzew of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM
ENVn.. LJ. 409,415 (1995).
146 Rumbach,supranote 135,at 367.
147 See Rumbach, supra note 135, at 367; Daniel Mandelker, Investments-Backed

Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215,233-36 (1995); Michelman,supra note 145,

at 415.

148 See Rumbach,supra note 135,at 367-68. As a practical matter,land-use law has long

provided substantial protection to actual development ofland through its vested rights doctrine.
This body of law says that at a certain point in the development process, usually including
issuance of a building pennit together with some reasonable development expenditures, a
landowner has established vested rights in current pennitted uses which cannot be subsequently
restricted by government regulations. Although what is necessary to establish vested rights
varies considerably from state to state, in no state is the mere purchase price of undeveloped
land, even when reflecting then pennitted land uses, sufficient to establish vested rights.
Perhaps the most obvious way to give content to Penn Centrals interference with investment
backed expectations standard is through vested rights doctrine, saying that at the point ofvested
rights investment-backed expectations have been established sufficient to demonstrate a taking
if they are interfered with, absent a nuisance. See Mandelker, supra note 147, at 236-37
(suggesting such an approach).
l49 See Carol M. Rose,A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights and the
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 265,267-68 (1996).
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significant economic impacts on affected landowners. However, a takings
analysis is necessarily fact sensitive and therefore agricultural zoning might
constitute a taking in some situations. Most obvious, of course, is where it leaves
the landowner with no economic viability. This might occur where the property is
totally unsuitable for agricultural use because of size, location, or soil
conditions.150 Although the "economic viability" standard itself is murky, where
such a finding is made, a taking should result.
Similarly, even where some economic viability remains, a taking might still
be found under the Penn Central factors. As suggested above, this should not
occur based simply on appreciated value from the time of purchase, or even
where a significant loss occurs from a reasonable market purchase. A taking may
be possible, however, where significant diminution in value occurs, together with
what would appear to be reasonable expectations of development reflected in a
purchase price. This would be particularly true if the property was singled-out for
regulation rather than being part of more comprehensive planning.
As a practical matter, most agricultural zoning should not present any of these
problems. This is particularly true where it occurs in a thoughtful and reasonable
manner, seeking to preserve land best suited for agriculture and integrating such
preservation into broader comprehensive planning. Although affected landowners
might still suffer significant economic consequences, it should not be a taking.
Though establishing the above general analysis, the Supreme Court has not
itself ruled on the substantive merits of an agricultural zoning regulation.151 The
next section of this Article therefore examines lower court decisions that have
reviewed takings challenges to agricultural zoning. Though these decisions
largely incorporate and reflect Supreme Court takings standards, they also vary
with particular state approaches and sensitivities to the takings issue.

B. Lower Court Decisions
Although not yet generating a substantial body of caselaw, the last several
decades have seen an increasing number of cases reviewing agricultural zoning
restrictions. As often occurs in land-use law, state courts have taken various
150 See generally, e.g., Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct App.
1977) (holding agricultural zoning as applied to property unreasonable and confiscatory);
Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973) (holding agricultural zoning as
applied to property unconstitutional).
151 The Court, in McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986),
did decide a case in which it was alleged that restricting property to agriculture use constituted a
trucing. In McDonald, the property owner had submitted a proposal to subdivide property,
currently farmland, into 159 residential lots, which was rejected by the county for a variety of
reasons particular to the proposal. See id. at 392. The Court rejected the ta1cings argument on
ripeness grounds, however, stating that denial of a particular proposal did not constitute a final
determination of permitted uses, which was necessary before a takings claim could be
considered. See id. at 348-53.
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approaches, often turning on separate state constitutional protectionsl52 or
reflecting distinct state law standards for review of zoning decisions.153 Even
when ostensibly applying federal standards, state courts often incorporate distinct
analytical approaches. Moreover, as often happens in zoning cases, courts
sometimes fail to distinguish between substantive due process and takings
concerns, blending them together in the course of the court's analysis. This at
times makes difficult a clear understanding of how the court is treating the
"takings" aspect of the case as opposed to the substantive due process aspect.
Despite these potential differences and ambiguities, lower courts have
generally approached takings claims consistent with current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, rejecting takings challenges in the vast majority of cases.154 In
doing so lower courts often apply a two part analysis similar to that articulated by
the Supreme Court, which in essence incorporates the dual constitutional
concerns of substantive due process and takings.155 Because of the fact sensitive
nature of any takings claim, however, the ultimate outcome in these cases turns
on the specific facts of the case.156 In analyzing the takings dimension of the
above standard, courts have most often focused on whether the landowner
152 See, e.g., Jafay v. Board ofCmmty Comm'ns ofBoulder County, 848P.2d 892 (Colo.
1993) (applying provisions ofColorado Constitution).
153 See, e.g., Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(applying unique Illinois multi-factor balancing test).
154 See generally, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th
Cir. 1993); Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988); Habersham at
Northridge v. Fulton County Georgia, 632 F.Supp. 815 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Gilliland v. City of
Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct App. 1981); Gisler v. County ofMadera, 112 Cal. Rptr.
919, (Cal. Ct App. 1974); County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State
Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Racich v. County of
Boone, 625 N.E.2d 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Vanderburgh County Bd. of Comm'ns v. Rittenhouse, 575 N.E.2d 663
(Ind. Ct App. 1991); BeII River Assocs. v. Charles Township of China, 565 N.W.2d 695
(Mich. Ct App. 1997); Woolston v. Monticeilo Orderly Annexation Area Bd., No. Co-901389, 1990 WL 204290, at *l (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 1990); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands
Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (NJ. 1991); Eck v. City of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979);
Wilson v. Trustees Union Township, No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5025, at *l
(Ohio Ct App. Oct 26, 1998); Smythe v. Butler Township, 620 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct App.
1993); Oregonians in Action v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 854 P.2d 1010 (Or. Ct
App. 1993); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. Ct. App. 1993);
Joyce v. City ofPortland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); Codorus Township v. Rodgers,
492 A.2d 73 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1985); Chokecheny HiIIs Estate, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294
N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1980); see also, Van Arsdel v. Township ofAddison, 195 N.W.2d 21 (Mich.
Ct App. 1972) (upholding agricultural zoning against substantive due process challenge).
155 SeeGardnerv. New JerseyPinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N. J. 1991).
156 See id. (stating the "application of takings principles requires a fact-sensitive
examination of the regulatozy scheme . . .'); see also Codorus Township, 492 A.3d at 76
(holding that the validity of agricultural restriction must be determined in specific context).
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retained a reasonable or economically viable use of the land.157 In doing so,
courts have clearly put the burden on the affected property owner to establish that
there is no reasonable or economically viable use left of the property. Thus, in
several cases courts have readily dismissed takings challenges by saying that the
owner failed to carry the burden that there were no economically viable uses of
the property.158
A particularly thorough opinion in analyzing takings challenges to
agricultural zoning is Gardner v. New Jersey Pine/ands Commissionn,159 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the agricultural zoning provisions
of the Pinelands Protection Act. Those provisions significantly limited residential
development in "Agricultural Production Zones," primarily restricting
development to one unit per forty acres, with actual development clustered on
one-acre lots and a permanent deed restriction on the remaining land.160 The
plaintiff, owner of a 217 acre farm, desired to subdivide his property into 14 to 17
acre "farmettes," which was denied.161 He then challenged the restriction as an
unconstitutional taking and sought compensation.162
The court began its analysis by emphasizing the important societal interests in
farmland preservation, and noted that the restrictions on residential development
clearly furthered those interests.163 It then stated that the critical remaining
question was whether the economic impact interfered to an "impennisS1ble
degree" with valuable property rights, in essence, asking whether it was a
taking.164 It began its analysis by noting that mere diminution in value,
"impairment of marketability," and reduced income or profits do not by
themselves constitute a taking.165 Rather, a taking occurs only if a regulation
denies "all practical use of property'' or "substantially destroys the beneficial use
of private property."l66 Thus, the proper focus is on the "beneficial or economic
uses allowed to a property owner'' in a particular context, rather than what has

157 See Christensen, 995 F.2d at 165; Jafay v. Board of Cotmty Comm'rs of Boulder
Cotmty,848 P2d892 (Colo. 1993); County ofAda, 678 P 2dat 997; Vanderburgh, 515 N.E.2d
at 67-68; Bell River Assocs., 565 N.W.2dat 700; Woolston, 1990 WL 204290,at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 1990); Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257; Murray, 865 P.2dat 1320; Wilson, 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5025, at *12.
l58 See Christensen, 995 F2dat 165; Bell River Assocs., 565 N.W2dat 699-700; Wilson,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5025,at *12; Murray, 865 P.2dat 1320.
159 593 A.2d251 (N.J. 1991).
160 See id. at 256.
161 See id. at 253,256.
162 See id. at 253.
163 See id. at 257-59.
164 Id. at 259.
l65 Id. at 259-60.
166 Id. at 260.
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been lost.167
The comt then analyzed the agricultural zoning question, drawing close
comparisons to the Supreme Comt's takings analysis in Penn Central. It noted
that, like Penn Central, the regulation pennitted the property owner to continue
existing use of the property.168 The comt also noted that under the facts of the
case the plaintiff could "gainfully use all of his property," which under the
particular regulation pennitted building up to five homes in a cluster
arrangement.169 Finally, there was no showing of interference with investment
backed expectations.170
Most lower comt decisions, though not engaging in the same level of analysis
as Gardner, essentially come to the same conclusion-agricultural zoning is not a
taking as long as the land is suitable for agricultural use and is economically
viable.171 This is particularly true where the property was purchased for
agricultural use and thus, there is no interference with investment-backed
expectations.172 Even where property has been newly zoned, courts have not
found a taking on that basis alone.173 Only the Idaho Supreme Court, speaking in
dictum, suggested it might under its own constitution find a taking where
substantial diminution in value results from downzoning, although it
acknowledged it would probably not be a taking under federal standards.174
In a few cases, however, courts focusing on economic viability or reasonable
use have found takings to exist where the land was truly unsuitable for fanning
activity. This has typically involved situations where the agricultural classification
had been used as a ''holding" restriction until the government was ready to
167 Id.

l68 See id. at 261.

169 Id.

170 See id.
171 See cases cited supra note 157.
I 72 See, e.g., Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County Ga., 632 F.Supp. 815,823 (N.D.
Ga. 1985); Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627, 632-33 (Cal. Ct App. 1981);
Woolston v. Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd.,No. Co-90-1389, 1990 WL 204290, at
*2 (Minn. Ct App. Dec. 18, 1990); Chokecherry Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294
N.W.2d 654,656 (S.D. 1980).
173 See Christensen v. Yolo County Bd of Supervisors,995 F.2d 161,163 (9th Cir. 1993);
Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919,922-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Gardner v. New
Jersey Pinelands,593 A.2d 251 (N. J. 1991).
174 See generally County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983). In Ada the comt
held that an agricultural zoning restriction did not constitute a taking when the landowners had
knowledge of the restrictions when they purchased the land. See id. at 997. It further noted in
dictum that under the then recently decided United States Supreme Comt decision in Agins v.
City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),a taking would not occur even if property is downzoned
subsequent to purchase as long as "some residual value remains in the property." Ada, 668 P.2d
at 997. It strongly suggested,how�ver,that it might well find a taking in such an instance under
its own state constitution. See id.
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consider development later. For example, in Peterson v. City ofDecorah,175 the
Iowa Court of Appeals folllld an agricultural zoning ''unreasonable and
confiscatory" where the city aclmowledged it zoned the property agricultural as a
holding classification, even though it was llllsuitable for agricultural use and had
not been productive for years.176 Similarly, in Kmiec v. Town ofSpider Lake,177
the Wisconsin Supreme Court folllld an agricultural restriction invalid where it
was again admittedly used as a ''holding" classification for future use,1 78 despite
the llllSuitability of the property for farming. Indeed, as noted by the court, the
land had a "negative value" as farmland since it would cost between $150 and
$200 per acre to put the land back into farming condition, and its value as
farmland would then be $75 per acre.179
As suggested above, the majority of lower court decisions have focused on
economic viability in analyzing whether agricultural zoning constitutes a taking.
However, the state which has decided the most agricultural zoning cases, Illinois,
takes a more distinctive approach, deciding zoning cases llllder a unique multi.
factor balancing test, lmown as the La Salle Bank test.ISO This test requires courts
to resolve zoning cases by balancing eight factors, including the following:
examination of surrollllding zoning designations, diminution in property value,
the extent to which the zoning furthers the public welfare, the relative gain to the
public and hardship to the restricted landowner, the suitability of the property as
zoned, and the care of land-use planning behind the decision.181 These factors,
which blend both substantive due process and takings concerns, tend to lead to
greater scrutiny of zoning decisions than typically folllld in most other states.
In an early and influential decision, Wilson v. County of McHenry,182 the
Illinois Court of Appeals, in a consolidation of two separate cases, held that an
agricultural zoning designation requiring a minimum of 160 acre lots was valid
under the above factors. The first case involved property initially zoned for one
and one-eighth acre lots when the plaintiff bought it, which was later rezoned to a
minimum lot size of 5 acres and eventually to the 160 acre minimum, which was
175 259N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977).
176 Id. at 554-55.
177 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973).
l78 See id.

at 476-77.

179 Id. at 474.

180 T he La Salle Bank test emerged from a seminal Illinois zoning case, La Salle Nat 'l
Bank v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 1957), in which the Illinois Supreme Court
articulated the basic factors that should be balanced in reviewing the validity of a zoning
restriction. The number of factors have been expanded slightly over the years, but it continues
to form the basic test that is applied in all Illinois zoning cases.
l81 See, e.g., Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Harvard
State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Racich v.
County ofBoone, 625N.E.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
182 416N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
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challenged as a talcing.183 The evidence also indicated that the property was worth
$18,000 to $20,000 per lot for I acre residential development, but less than
$4,000 per acre as zoned.184 In the second case, the owner had owned the land for
twenty years prior to the rezoning, and evidence indicated the property was worth
$1,440,000 for I acre residential development but only $500,000 as farmland.185
As then operated, the farms in both cases were only marginally successful
economically, although there was evidence that better management practices
could improve their yield and economic success.186 There was also conflicting
evidence in both cases about how much ofthe property was prime farmland.187
The court upheld the validity of the minimum 160 acre lot requirement as
applied to both properties, finding that neither landowner had carried the burden
ofshowing the unreasonableness ofthe restriction. Particularly significant to the
court was the fact that the predominate land use in the vicinity ofboth properties
was agricultural and that the zoning had occmred pursuant to a comprehensive
planning process.188 The court also stressed that neither lost profit nor diminution
in value by themselves were sufficient to invalidate a zoning when a strong public
interest exists.189 The court found such a strong public interest in the preservation
ofgood farmland.190
Several more recent lliinois decisions have similarly upheld agricultural
zoning restrictions.191 In Harvard State Bank, the court upheld an agricultural
restriction as applied to a 64.5 acre parcel ofland. 192 In recognizing the validity
ofthe agricultural restriction, the court emphasized the dominant agricultural use
ofsmrounding property, the productivity ofthe land in question, and the existence
of a comprehensive plan.193 It also noted that although the property would be
worth t\vice as much ifused for residential development,194 the plaintiffs bought
the land zoned agricultural, and therefore there was no interference with their
expectations. Similarly, in Racich v. County of Boone,l 95 the court upheld the
validity ofan agricultural zoning restriction, stressing the comprehensive plan and
183 See id. at 427-28.
184 Id. at 429.
185 See id. at 432.
186 See id. at 429-31.
187 See id. at 428-32.
188 See id.
l 89 See id. at 429.
190 See id. at 430.
191 See Harvard State Bank v. Cotmty ofMcHemy, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
192 See id. at 1364-66.
193 The parcel was worth $258,000 zoned agricultural, whereas it would be worth

$516,000 ifzoned to pennit residential development on one acre lots. See id. at 1363.
194 See id. at 1363-64. The court also noted that even though the property was zoned
agricultural, it had increased in value by $32,000 from the time the plaintiffs had purchased it.
195 625 N.E.2d 1095 (111. App. Ct 1993).
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the thoroughness of the fannland rating system, and that any loss in value was a
mere "expectancy."196
However, on several occasions Illinois courts have struck down agricultural
zoning under its multi-factor balancing. In two earlier cases, Semja v. County of
Boone191 and Pettee v. County ofDeKalb,l 98 the property was largely unsuitable
for agricultural use. In Semja a majority of the property was comprised of either
woods or "sub-marginal" fannland.199 Similarly, in Pettee a substantial part of the
property had significant drainage problems; it was therefore unsuitable for
farming.200
Illinois courts again struck down agricultural zoning provisions in two more
recent decisions-Harris Bank ofHinsdale v. County ofKendal[201 and Twigg v.
County ofWill.202 Significantly, unlike Semja andPettee, there was no indication
in either Harris Bank or Twigg that the property was unsuitable for farming or
could not be profitable with that use.203 Nevertheless, both decisions upheld trial
court determinations that found the restrictions invalid under a balancing of the La
Salle factors.204 Although the courts considered several factors, including the
compatibility of the proposed changes with surrounding uses, both particularly
emphasized the lack of thoughtful planning evidenced in the agricultural
restrictions. In Harris Bank the court stressed that the zoning was inconsistent
with the county's own comprehensive plan, which placed the property in an
''urbanizing area."20s Similarly, in Twigg, the court characterized the zoning of
the entire area, including the land in question, as being done in an "arbitrary''
manner and that the "land use plan was not carefully designed.''206 Neither court
placed much emphasis on the economic impact-with the Twigg court noting it
was "not determinative," but a factor in the landowner's favor,201 while the
Harris Bank court ignored it altogether.208
Generally speaking, these Illinois cases applying the unique La Salle
balancing test apply a level of scrutiny greater than found in most states when
196 See id. at 1098-99.
197 339 N.E.2d 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
198 376 N.E.2d 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
199 See Semja, 339 N.E.2d at 455.
200 See Pettee, 376 N.E.2d at 725.
201 625 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
202 627 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
203 See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 746; Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 846.
204 Both courts stressed deference to how the trial courts assessed and weighed the La
Salle Bank factors. See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 745; Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 848-50.
205 See Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 846.
206 See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 746.
207 See id. at 748.
208 See Harris, 625 N.E.2d at 845-51.
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reviewing zoning decisions.209 Moreover, the test itself is a blend of several
considerations, including both substantive due process and takings concerns, and
thus does not fit neatly into a more traditional takings analysis. Nevertheless, the
cases generally affirm that if done right, agricultural zoning should not pose
takings problems. Importantly, though recognizing that the economic impact on
the affected landowner is a factor to be considered, the cases indicate that this
alone ,vill not result in a taking when balanced against benefits to the public.21 0
Rather, agricultural zoning will be invalid only when the property is unsuitable
for agricultural use, or the restriction is not pursuant to sound zoning principles,
such as proper use of a comprehensive plan.
It should be noted, of course, that courts in any jurisdiction will occasionally
invalidate agricultural zoning on grounds other than takings. For example, in City
of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Assessment Assoc. No. 1,211 the Virginia
Supreme Court struck down an attempt to downzone four hundred acres of land
from a planned unit development to an agricultural district Virginia law required
that for such ''piecemeal" downzoning to be valid, a "change or mistake" from the
prior zoning had to be shown,212 which the city failed to do. The city admitted
that there were no changed circumstances to justify the rezoning, nor had any
fraud or mistake been shown.213 Importantly, however, the court also rejected the
landowner's claim for interim damages, specifically stating that the downzoning
did not constitute a taking because the agricultural restriction did not deprive the
owner of"all economically viable use of the property."214
An earlier and often cited decision that struck down an agricultural zoning
scheme is Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Golla.215 There the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a sliding scale agricultural zoning
ordinance that permitted clustering of residential units, but permitted no more
than five contiguous one and one-half acre residential lots, regardless of the size
209 Connnentators have generally characterized Illinois courts as more closely scrutinizing
zoning decisions than courts in other states. See ROBERT C. EWCKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAND-USE CONIROLS 75-76 (1981); NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 6.16 (1988).
210 See, e.g., Racich v. County of Boone,625 N.E.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993);
Wilson v. County ofMcHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426,429 (Ill.App. Ct 1981).
211 389 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1990).
212 Id. at 314. Several states follow what is known as the "change or mistake" rule in
reviewing rezonings. This rule states that for a rezoning to be valid the local government must
show either that conditions have changed since the original zoning to justify the change or that
the original zoning was based on a mistake of some type. See generally, DANIEL MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAWS 227-29 (2d ed. 1988).
213 See VirginiaLandAssessmentAssoc.,389 S.E.2d at 314.
214 Id.; see generally Grand Land Co. v. Township of Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818 (N.J.
1984) (invalidating restriction but specifically stating that agricultural zoning did not constitute
a taking because it permitted economically viable use of the property).
215 452A.2d 1337 (Pa. 1982).
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of the overall tract.216 AB applied to the plaintiff's 140 acres, this pennitted a 7Yz
acre development and a residual 132Yz acre farm.217 A plurality of the court found
the ordinance unconstitutional for two reasons. First, by limiting development to
no more than five lots "regardless of the size of the original tract, an unreasonably
severe limitation [was] placed upon pennissible land uses."218 In this regard it
also stated that the need to establish "an agricultural tract as large as 132 1/2
acres" was not clearly shown.219 Second, it also found that the scheme
unreasonably discriminated against large lot owners in favor of small lot owners
by limiting total residential lots to five.220
Although Hopewell touched upon takings concerns in finding the scheme
unreasonably severe upon large lot owners, its analysis was primarily grounded in
substantive due process.221 Moreover, Hopewell was greatly limited three years
later in Boundary Drive Associates v. Shrewsbury Township Board of
Supervisors,222 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld another
agricultural zoning ordinance using a sliding scale allocation method. The
ordinance was very similar to the one struck down in Hopewell, but did not cap
the maximum number of residences at a particular point, instead pennitting one
additional residential unit per thirty acres of land. However, it did impose a
maximum of two dwellings permitted on prime farmland, regardless of tract
size.223
The court upheld this sliding-scale allocation scheme as constitutional,
distinguishing it from Hopewell on the basis that, unlike Hopewell, it related
residential development to tract size.224 However, it also upheld the maximum
two-dwelling limit on prime farmland irrespective of tract size, acknowledging it
was very similar to the fixed scale struck down in Hopewell, but stating it should
be viewed as part of the broader scheme.225 AB a practical matter, Shrewsbury
significantly limited Hopewell and provides Pennsylvania local governments with
substantial flexibility in implementing agricultural zoning. In particular,
Shrewsbury affirmed the validity of large lot agricultural zoning as a means of
preserving farmland, and in the case of prime farmland, the decision approved the
use of potentially significant restrictions.
216 See id. at 1338-39.
217 See id. at 1343.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See id.
221 See Codorus Township v. Rodgers, 492 A.2d 73, 75 (Pa Connnw. Ct. 1985) (stating
that the ''thrust'' of Hopewell was directed at irrational results under substantive due process).
222 491 A.2d 86 (Pa 1985).
223 See id. at 88-89.
224 See id. at 91.
225 See id. at 92.
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In sum, lower courts have generally affirmed the constitutional validity of
agricultural zoning, and in particular that it should not pose a takings problem if
done pursuant to soi.md planning.226 Although often blending substantive due
process with takings concerns, and at times turning on the unique features of state
law, the decisions largely affirm and are consistent with Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. In particular, lower courts have consistently rejected takings
challenges as long as the property was economically viable as farmland, even
when there was a substantial diminution in property value. The only apparent
exceptions to this are the Harris Bank and Twigg decisions in Illinois, both of
which not only applied that state's unique balancing test, but also emphasized the
lack of proper planning in zoning the property agricultural.227 On the other hand,
courts have been willing to strike down agricultural zoning in limited situations,
such as where the property is truly i.msuitable for fanning.228
Significantly, these cases clearly establish, consistent with the Supreme
Court's own analysis, that substantial diminution in value or economic impact on
the landowner is not enough to establish a taking. Even Illinois courts, which
apply the most scrutiny to zoning restrictions and include diminution in value as a
factor in their analysis, have not placed much emphasis on it. However, the
question remains whether substantial diminution in value pursuant to agricultural
zoning, though not constituting an i.mconstitutional taking, is nevertheless unfair
to landowners and should be avoided for that reason. The next section will
address that issue.

IV. FAIRNESS IN FARMLAND PRESERVATION
Beyond the constitutional challenge that agricultural zoning constitutes a
taking, is the equally common assertion that it is unfair because it forces a few
landowners to bear the cost of preserving farmland for the benefit of many. This
fairness argument is not unique to farmland preservation, but is often asserted
with a variety of environmental regulations.229 However, it is most forcefully
226 See cases cited supra note 154.
227 See Twigg v. Cotn1ty of Will,627 N.E.2d 742,746 {Ill. App. Ct 1994); Harris Bank of
Hinsdale v. County ofKendall,625 N.E.2d 845,851 {Ill. App. Ct 1993).
228 See Semja v. Cotn1ty ofBoone,339 N.E.2d 452,453-55 {Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Petersen
v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553, 554-55 (Iowa 1977); Kmiec v. Town of Spider, 211
N.W.2d 471,476-77 (Wis. 1973).
229 See Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"Environmental Takings", 46 S.C.L. REY. 613, 636 (1995); see also Marianne Lavelle, The
"Property Rights", NAT'L L.J.,May 10, 1993 at 1, 34 (discussing impetus for property rights
movement); Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Env't. & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 171, 172 (1995) (statement of Steven J.
Eagle,professor at George Mason Law School) (stating that compensation required as a matter
of fairness); see id. at 163-65 (statement of Jonathan Adler, Associate Director of
Environmental Studies for the Competitive Enterprise Institute) (stating that if the public wants
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made with regard to environmental regulations that restrict environmentally
sensitive land, which often affect a limited mnnber of property owners with
substantial diminution in value to bestow benefits on society as a whole.
The essence of the fairness argmnent is that environmental regulations, like
farmland preservation, force a few landowners to bear the cost of preserving
farmland for the benefit of society more generally. As noted earlier, the need for
government intervention to preserve farmland is that most of the benefits from
preservation in terms of food security and environmental amenities go to society
as a whole, rather than the affected landowner.230 Thus, the argmnent is made that
if most of the benefits from farmland preservation go to society as a whole, then
the cost of preservation should be placed on society as well.
The perceived unfairness of requiring affected landowners to bear the cost of
agricultural preservation is exacerbated by what might be seen as two distinctions
between restrictions on environmentally sensitive land and more typical zoning
restrictions. First, whereas most zoning restrictions typically permit some
development, such as single-family residential, restrictions on environmentally
sensitive land prohibit development altogether. This is viewed as a more extreme
regulation and often, though not inevitably, results in a greater diminution in
value than might result from other zoning regulations.231
Second, efforts to preserve environmentally sensitive land often are perceived
as affecting only a limited number of property owners and lack the reciprocal
benefits often found in other zoning contexts. For example, a typical single-family
zoning restriction will apply evenly to a wide number of property owners, thus
imposing comparable bmdens and bestowing benefits to a large number of
similarly situated landowners. In contrast, restrictions on environmentally
sensitive land often restrict a more limited number of property owners with the
benefits more clearly going to broader society.232
to protect private land with environmental value, then the public should be willing to pay for it
through provision ofcompensation).
230 In economic terms this would be viewed as an "extemality" problem, because most of
the benefits offarmland preservation will be external to the decisionmaking process in that they
go to society as a whole. Although externalities do not always result in an inefficient use of
resources, they often do by failing to consider the full range of cost and benefits from the
decision. This might well be the case with regard to agricultural zoning.
231 The actual diminution in value will, of course, depend on various factors, particularly
the percentage of the property subject to the restriction. If the entire parcel is subject to a
restriction to keep the property in its natural state, the diminution in value can be substantial,
since it likely prohibits development altogether. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Cmmcil,
505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (stating that the most obvious instance of''no economic viability"
is where property must be left in its natural state).
232 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings
and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 361 (1997) (noting how under the Endangered Species
Act "[r]egulated property owners constitute only a small fraction of the population that enjoys
[the Act's] benefits," yet neighbors and the broader public who enjoy the benefits do not have
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As thus presented, the fairness argument does not necessarily dispute the
wisdom of farmland preservation, but instead questions who should pay for it
Whatever the merits of preservation, it is arguably unfair to force a few
landowners to bear the burden of bestowing benefits on the rest of society.233
Thus, the argument is made that if the benefits from preservation go to society as
a whole, then society should pay for such benefits in the form of compensation to
affected landowners.234 For this reason alternative preservation schemes
involving Purchase of Development Rights or Transferrable Development Rights
are viewed as more equitable in that they shift the cost of preservation from the
regulated landowner back to society.
The above fairness argument-very much at the heart of the ctuTent property
rights debate and farmland preservation efforts-has substantial intuitive appeal.
Moreover, despite its elusive nature, fairness remains a central component of any
serious discussion of the relative balance of property rights and environmental
regulation.235 Even assuming the constitutionality of agricultural zoning, fairness
is an important component in setting policy and affects the political acceptability
of alternative outcomes.236 Thus, some discussion of the fairness of agricultural
zoning, beyond its general constitutionality, is warranted.
Though quite important, the idea of fairness in land use controls is admittedly
both vague and quite subjective. However, as a general matter, it most sensibly
concerns how the burdens and benefits of land use controls should be shared and
distributed across society. More particularly, the fairness critique of agricultural
zoning turns on a perception that regulated property owners are forced to give up
substantial property interests, reflected in diminution of property values, in order
to pay).

233 One leading proponent ofthe property rights movement puts it this way: ''The property
rights movement is not seeking less environmental protection; it asks only that a few unlucky
landowners not be forced to bear an unfair share ofthe burdens imposed by such regulations."
Marzulla,supranote229, at 639.
234 See Michael M. Berger, Dollars and Damages: A Debate-Yes! It's the Fair Thing to
Do, PLANNING, Mar. 1996, at 22-24 (arguing in favor oflegislation requiring compensation to
landowners when environmental regulations diminish property values).
235 Courts and commentators have often noted that fairness is a central concern in
analyzing regulatory takings. In recent years the Supreme Court has often stated that the takings
clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994) (quoting Annstrong, 364 U.S. at 49); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting Annstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). Commentators have similarly
noted the centrality of fairness in takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, EcONOMICS, AND POLIDCS 6 (1995); Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REY. 1165, 1171-72 (1967); see also Lazarus, supra note 12 (discussing
importance ofaddressing fairness concerns in environmental law).
236 See Lazarus, supra note 12.
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to bestow benefits on the rest ofsociety.
Though it admittedly has some intuitive appeal, the argmnent that agricultural
zoning is inherently unfair is overstated for several basic reasons. First, it
presumes that the entire profit potential of private property has somehow been
earned by the landowner, when in fact a substantial portion of private property
value is often established by government "givings." Recognizing this necessarily
tempers the perception of unfairness when agricultural zoning reduces profit
potential. Second, the concept of fairness concerns an understanding of not only
how burdens and benefits are distnbuted within a single government action, but
must also focus on the reciprocal nature of burdens and benefits within society
more broadly. Even though one might be burdened by a particular land use
regulation, fairness is provided through reciprocal benefits in other regulatory
contexts. Third, the fairness critique ofagricultural zoning emphasizes the private
development perspective of property rights, without recognizing the social
dimension of property ownership integral to our legal system. This social
dimension of property indicates that restricting land to agricultural use for the
common good can be viewed as an inherent limitation in the property rather than
a deprivation ofrights.
Each of these three points will be discussed below briefly. Together they
indicate that agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair, even when it results in
substantial diminution in value. This is not to say that agricultural zoning is never
unfair; certainly it, like any other land use control, might be unfair as applied to a
particular tract ofland. Nor should it preclude some modified use ofPDR or IDR
programs to provide some compensation to landowners in order to more evenly
distribute the regulatory burden between affected landowners and the broader
public. But viewed from a broad perspective, the following subsections
demonstrate that restricting land to agricultural use without accompanying
compensation should not be viewed as inherently unfair.

A. "Givings" and Fairness
Central to the fairness critique ofagricultural zoning is the idea that regulated
property owners suffer substantial economic loss in order to benefit the rest of
society. This presupposes that landowners have a valid claim to all the market
value of their property. Thus, when the value of land is greatly reduced by
agricultural zoning relative to development potential, landowners perceive a
substantial loss oftheir wealth to the public as a whole.
The perceived unfairness of lost value is substantially lessened, however,
when recognizing that a substantial portion of that value was added by
government activity to begin with. AB noted by various commentators, much of
the value of farmland is a result of government givings, actions by government
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which enhance the value ofthe regulated land.237 Jbis might occur with fannland
in numerous ways, such as farm subsidy programs238 and mortgage deductions,
both ofwhich indirectly enhance fannland values.239
Government action also enhances land values by minimizing the harms that
might otherwise affect landowners, especially those arising from incompatible
land uses. Thus, the very scheme ofrestricting property use adds significant value
to neighboring property.240 Specifically, the increased value of agricultural land
in alternative, residential use in part exists because government zoning would
protect any residential development from conflicting industrial and commercial
uses. Any arguments based on diminution in value necessarily reflect property
values largely enhanced by protective government regulatory schemes. As
recently noted by several leading land use scholars, "much ofthe value that some
advocates today want to protect against regulation exists in significant part
because ofthe protection ofthe regulatory system they challenge."241
Perhaps the most obvious example of government givings in regard to
fannland subject to development pressure is basic infrastructure support that
makes land developable in the first instance. 1bis is particularly relevant with
regard to fannland preservation issues, where conversion pressure and enhanced
land values are the result ofgovernment support. Therefore, the value ofland for
intensive development largely reflects government investment rather than the
mere initiative oflandowners. In particular, road and other infrastructure support,
which makes land developable in the first instance, are paid primarily by general
tax revenues and yet often result in disproportionate :financial benefit to
undeveloped land, often fannland, in proximity to development. It is not
obviously unfair in such situations to preserve farmland with the result that some
ofthe publicly created value ofthe land is, in effect, rettnned to the public.
Edward Thompson makes this point forcefully in the context of the Lucas
decision, discussing the various ways in which the value ofMr. Lucas's property
See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. 011 the E11v't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 163, 16�5 (1995) (statement of C. Ford
237

Runge, Professor, Dept. of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota)
(discussing various ways government actions enhance private property values); Donald L.
Elliott, Givings and Takings, LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG., Jan. 1996, at 3; Edward
Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENvn.. FORUM, MarlApr. 1994 at 22.
238 See C. Ford Runge and Tim Searchinger, Who s Really Getting Taken? The Last

Thing We Need is a Vast New Entitlement Program for LandoW11ers, NEW DEMOCRAT,

SeptJOct. 1995, at 27, 28; Thompson, supra note 237, at 22-23.
239 See Thompson, supra note 237, at 23 (noting that income tax deduction for mortgage
interest is capitalized into home values).
240 See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328-29 (2d ed. 1986).
241 Daniel R Mandelker et al., Good Planning, Consistent Regulation, and Fair Decision
Maki11g: A Prescription for Avoiding Takings Challenges, at 10 (1996) (paper prepared for
American Planning Association's Property Rights Task Force, on file with author).
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was enhanced by government "givings." He states:
Whether or not one agrees with the decision in his case, the fact remains that
both Lucas's ability to build on the beach and the value of his beachfront lots
were augmented by government action. Public authorities had constructed a
bridge to provide access to the island, roads to drive on, water and sewage
systems to serve the houses, and beach protection measures to prevent them from
washing away. On top of that, the government has helped underwrite flood
insurance to cushion the loss when those measures fail. All of these taxpayer
financed improvements contnbuted to the value of Lucas's property and in all
likelihood spelled the difference between its being attractive for development
and a financially worthless strip of shifting sand. In effect, much of the
government's financial exposure for taking the Lucas property was attnbutable
to the government itseif.242
Thompson does not necessarily disagree with the Lucas result, but argues for
recognition of government givings as well as takings in the property rights debate.
He further notes the potential problem of property owners "double dipping in the
public treasury" by receiving benefits from government actions which give
significant value to land and then being compensated when environmental
regulations reduce land values.243 This is potentially unfair to the public at large
by requiring that they, in effect, pay affected landowners twice: once through
paying for infrastructure supports that greatly enhance property values, and a
second time through compensatory payments when environmental regulations
diminish property values.
This discussion of givings is not meant to ignore or minimize the role . of
private enterprise in enhancing land values. Certainly property worth reflects
substantial private as well as public initiative. Nor is it meant to completely
foreclose the possibility of some compensatory scheme in preserving farmland.
However, it does indicate that reduced land values often reflect only a taking back
of what the government itself has created, which can hardly be labeled unfair.244
242 T hompson, supra note 237, at 22.
243 See id. at 26.
244 It is important to note, ofcourse, that in recent years developers have been increasingly
required to pay for some infrastructure costs through exaction requirements, typically in the
fonn of land dedications and impact fees. See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A.
GoMEZ-lBANEZ, REGULATIONFORREvENlJE, 19-20, 35-39 (1994); Gus Bauman & WilliamH.
Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey ofAmerican Practices, 50 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 62 (1987). It might therefore be argued that through the practice of
exactions landowners themselves pay for the enhanced value of the land. This is subject to two
significant limitations. First, property values are substantially enhanced by government
activities not typically financed by exactions, such as major highways. Second, the amount of
exactions can only correspond to the burden imposed by the development, not the enhanced
property values created by the infrastructure. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375
(1994) (requiring ''rough proportionality'' between exaction and development impact). As a
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It also suggests that loss of truly deserved land value is often not nearly as great as
might at first appear. To the extent it does exist, it is often more attenuated and
must be seen in the context of the give and take of broader regulatory efforts,
which is the focus of the next subsection ofthis Article.

B. Reciprocity and Distributive Fairness
Closely related to the idea of government givings is the concept of
reciprocity, which similarly suggests that agricultural zoning is not inherently
unfair. Frequently emphasized by the Supreme Court in its takings analysis,245
reciprocity essentially refers to the idea that government regulations typically
bestow both reciprocal benefits and burdens. In a limited sense, this might refer
only to benefits and burdens flowing from the same regulation, what might be
called specific reciprocity.246 In the case of zoning, for example, individual
landowners are burdened by restrictions placed on their land, but receive benefits
from similar restrictions placed on other property. As a practical matter, the
benefits and burdens from a specific regulation might not be distributed evenly,
nor do the benefits necessarily outweigh the burdens. Yet reciprocal benefits
serve to at least partially offset losses and burdens imposed by the same
regulation.
Reciprocity can also be viewed from a more general perspective, in which the
reciprocal benefits and burdens of regulatory life in general are considered, as
opposed to only those flmving from a specific regulation.247 The Supreme Court
is arguably alluding to general reciprocity when it says that it is usually fair to
assume that legislation is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life" to secure an "average reciprocity of advantage."248 Thus, even if a particular
restriction might not provide significant reciprocity for an affected party, there are
likely other instances in which the party receives benefits at the expense of others.
Over the long run, such benefits and burdens tend to even out.249
practical matter, the enhanced value of property through exactions imposed by government in
its coordinating fimction far exceeds the cost ofthe exaction.
245 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 {1922). For
general discussions of the Supreme Court's treatment of reciprocity in takings analysis, see
Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity ofAdvantage andRegulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory
of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 297 (1990); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the
"Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage" Rules in Comprehensive Takings
Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1449 (1997).
246 See Cordes, supra note 13, at 236.
241 See id. at 236-37.
248 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415); Penn
Central, 439 U.S. at 124.
249 Professor Frank Michelman makes this point in his seminal article on takings,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation
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The perceived unfairness of agricultural zoning in part results from a lack of
specific reciprocity in such restrictions. Although the degree of specific
reciprocity for affected landowners depends on a number of variables, it is fair to
assume that in many instances any reciprocal benefits from agricultural zoning
are quite limited. As noted earlier, most of the benefits from agricultural zoning
go to neighbors and broader society. Although the regulated landowner shares in
such benefits, that person's share will likely be quite small when compared to the
potential financial loss, especially if nearby property is permitted to develop. This
results in a perception that the benefits and burdens of regulation are unevenly
distributed, which understandably touches on issues of fairness.
From the broader perspective of general reciprocity, however, there is little
doubt that affected owners of regulated fannland receive substantial reciprocal
benefits from regulatory life in general. As discussed in the previous subsection,
this might involve givings in terms of farm subsidies and infrastructure
development, as well as the substantial benefits from land use controls on
surrounding property. Farm property also benefits from various environmental
protections on surrounding land, such as wetlands and floodplain controls. On a
broader level, as members of society, owners of fannland benefit from numerous
economic and social regulations designed to facilitate commerce and protect
citizens from the harmful consequences of economic activity.
Any serious fairness argument must recognize the significant regulatory
benefits that flow to landowners from other regulations. To focus only on the
burden from a particular regulation distorts the regulatory equation, making
government accountable for the burdens imposed, but not for the benefits created.
For all practical purposes, this would make almost all government regulatory
efforts vulnerable to charges of unfairness, because when viewed in isolation
most regulations will burden some parties more than others.
The more proper perspective, as suggested by the Supreme Court, is to
recognize that the burdens imposed from any particular regulation are simply part
of "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life."250 From this perspective
any perceived distributive unfairness from agricultural zoning is necessarily
mitigated by the regulatory benefits bestowed on such landowners in other ways.
Law", 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967):
Efficiency-motivated coJlective measures will regularly inflict on countless people
disproportionate burdens which cannot practicaJly be erased by compensation settlements.
In the face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that we can arrive at an
acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated with coJlectively
determined improvements will have been distributed "evenly'' enough so that everyone
wiJl be a net gainer.

Id. at 1225.
250 Lucas, 505 U.S. at
Central, 439 U.S. at 124.

1017-18

(quoting Pennsylvania Coal,

260 U.S.

at

415); Penn
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This is not meant to suggest that the balance ofburdens and benefits always evens
out in the long haul, which might not always be the case.25 1 It does mean,
however, that our understanding offairness must be based on a broad perspective,
tempering any perceived unfairness based on burdens from a land use restriction
viewed in isolation.

C. Property Rights and Landowner Expectations
A third general response to the fairness argument concerns the nature of
property rights and landowner expectations. The argument that agricultural
zoning is unfair, because it forces a few landowners to suffer loss for the benefit
of broader society, is in part predicated on the idea that private property
ownership includes the right to use the property as the owner chooses. Thus,
agricultural zoning and similar restrictions are viewed as forcing landowners to
forego opportunities that are interwoven in their rights as property owners to
benefit society. The forced loss ofwhat are seen as normal property rights without
compensation exacerbate fairness concerns.
However, as a number oflegal commentators have noted, such a perspective
is neither the traditional nor the proper way to view property rights.252 Rather, our
legal system has long recognized that private property interests are subject to
broader public uses.253 This has been referred to at times as the social :fimction254
or social obligation of property, indicating that property ownership must be seen
in a broader social setting ,vith responsibilities as well as rights. Thus, restricting
property to agricultural use does not necessarily involve the deprivation of
property rights, but rather asserting a limitation inherent in the property use itself
This social dimension to private property is most clearly seen in nuisance
law, which requires that one not use property so as to cause an unreasonable hmm

25 1 Agricultural Economist C. Ford Runge, however, has argued that the vast majority of
farmland and natural resource land is owned by large landowners, and such owners tend to be
net winners in the big picture from government activity. See Private Property Rights and
Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Env't. & Pub. Works, 104th
Cong.163, 16�5 (1995).
252 See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean
Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENvIL. L. 1095
(1996); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996).
253 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L.
REv. 735, 751-52 {1985) (discussing restrictions on perceived noxious activity in early
America); Duncan, supra note 252 at 1133-37 (discussing types ofrestrictions on property use
found in early America); Rose, supra note 252 at 274-82 (same); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1055--60 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting) (discussing types ofland use restrictions in colonial period).
254 See Gerald Torres, Takings and Givings: Police Power, Public Value, and Private
Right, 26 ENvIL. L. 1, 5 (1996).

1078

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vo160:3

to others.255 Beyond that, however, courts have long held that use of private
property is subject to the common good and public rights. For example, as long
ago as 1846 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in upholding a prohibition on
owners removing sand or stone from private beaches, stated that "[a]ll property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used to injure the
equal rights of others, or to destroy or greatly impair the pubic rights and interests
of the community .... "256 The widespread growth and acceptance of landuse
restrictions in the early part of this century similarly reflects judicial recognition
that property interests are limited by social needs. Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself recognized this principle in a number of decisions during this period,
:frequently stating that property ownership is limited by public needs.257
This longstanding recognition that private property is subject to public
interests flows from the fact that property is a social construct258 and society can
legitimately define the extent of private property interests to be limited by social
concerns. Construing property interests in this manner recognizes that the
consequences of property use inevitably extend beyond land boundaries and will
often conflict with other social needs, necessitating a reasonable accommodation
of interests. This includes not only the avoidance of nuisance-like behavior, but
also protection of sensitive lands, including prime fannland, as an environmental
and social resource.259 Although the need to encourage investment in property
255 The prohibition on creating a nuisance to surrounding property owners has long been
recognized in English and American property law. What constitutes a nuisance, and how the
balance is drawn between competing property uses, has evolved over time, reflecting changing
societal values. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43
UCLA L. REv. 77, 100-01 (discussing evolution ofnuisance law in Anglo/American property
law and noting how it illustrates the "inherent ambiguity ofabsolute ownership').
256 Commonwealth v. Tewksbwy, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 57 (1846). For a discussion of
Tewksbury and other early cases that clearly show that private property was subject to public
rights, see Duncan, supra note 252.
257 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (holding that private property
interests must at times ''yield to the good of the community'' for the sake of "progress");
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (stating that private property
limited by other public interests, including exercise of the police power ''to protect the
atmosphere, the water and the forests''); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all
property in this countty is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use ofit shall not
be injurious to the community'').
258 Scholars and legal commentators have often noted that property is a social creation of
the state. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property,
Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENvn.. L. 171, 182
(1995); Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?,
17 VT. L. REv. 647, 653-55 (1993); Coletta, supra note 245, at 361-63.
259 Recent years have seen a growing understanding of the critical environmental role
played by certain lands, such as wetlands and coastal zones, and their interconnectedness with
the rest ofnature. A growing body oflegal scholarship is noting how understandings ofprivate
property must adapt to this changing understanding of ecology. This includes recognition that
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requires protection of private interests in many instances, it is reasonable to view
those private interests as ending when they interfere with broader social
interests.260
It is important to emphasize that this accommodation between private and
public interests is an inherent limitation in the nature of private property to begin
with, rather than a deprivation of interests. Thus, fairness argwnents predicated on
the deprivation of private interests for the public good are misplaced. To the
extent that agricultural zoning is designed to protect the public interest in a
valuable resource, it is simply asserting a limitation inherent in the property
mvnership to begin with. Certainly, sensitivity to the impact on private parties is
called for in such situations, but in discussing fairness it should not be viewed as
taking an established right from regulated landowners. The assertion of inherent
limitations is both reasonable and arguably fair.
For similar reasons, agricultural zoning is not necessarily an unreasonable
interference ,vith landmvner expectations. As discussed in Part III.A with regard
to takings, the fairness of agricultural zoning relative to landowner expectations is
most clearly seen with regard to instances where property was purchased with
agricultural restrictions in place and the landmvner is unsuccessfully seeking a
more intensive rezoning of the property. Although refusal to rezone in such a
situation might result in significant loss of potential profit, maintaining clllTent
restrictions designed to preserve public values can hardly be viewed as unfair.
Even where the purchase price reflects the potential for intensive development,
this is speculation on possible change and hardly deserving of compensation.261
such sensitive lands are affected with a public interest that necessarily must limit development.
See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 255, at 109-14, 135-38; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1433, 1442-49 (1993). Prime farmland clearly fits within this idea of valuable
environmental and social resource land. Not only does it confer environmental benefits not
unlike other sensitive lands, but is the source ofour current and future food production.
260 See, e.g., Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (stating that private
property interests must at times ''yield to the good ofthe community''); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("all property in this countiy is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community''); Commonwealth v.Alger, 7 Cush.
53, 84-85 (Mass. 1851) ("every holder of property ...holds it under'' limitation that it not be
injurious to others and held subject to "those general regulations, which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare'').
261 Courts have frequently commented that there is nothing unfair nor any interference
with reasonable expectations when landowners buy property with restrictions in place and have
requests for zoning changes denied, as long as the property remains profitable as originally
zoned. See, e.g., Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Gilliland v. City ofPalmdale, 179 Cal.Rptr. 627, 632-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); County
oflda v.Henry, 668 P2d 994, 997 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State Bank v. County ofMcHenry,
620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363-64 (Ill.App. Ct. 1993); Racich v. County ofBoone, 625 N.E2d 1095,
1099 (Ill.App. Ct. 1993); Woolston v.Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd.No. C0-901398, 1990 WL 204290 (Minn.App. Dec. 18, 1990); Chokecherry Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel

1080

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

The fairness concern over expectations is admittedly stronger, however,
when property is downzoned, reflecting substantial diminution in value. Even if
such a loss does not constitute a taking for the reasons discussed in Part III, there
is still arguably an element of unfairness in creating a significant loss for the
benefit of others. 1bis is, of course, exacerbated if the loss is concentrated on only
a few landowners, with the benefits from regulation going to a more diffuse
public.
Even here, however, legitimate fairness issues are tempered when seen in a
broader context. First, the previous discussion on givings and reciprocity is
relevant in that some of the lost value has often been created by government, and
losses that remain must be seen in the broader regulatory context. More
significantly, the idea of regulatory risk also tempers fairness concerns in such
situations. AB noted earlier, the Supreme Court has developed this theme in
several cases, stating that the risk of regulation is part of economic life, which
includes the possibility of economic loss.262 In Lucas, the Court specifically
applied this idea to land use regulation, stating that "[i]t seems to us that the
property owner necessarily expects the use of his property to be restricted, from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the state in legitimate
exercise of its police powers."263 Thus, since reasonable expectations necessarily
incorporate the possibility of land use restrictions, expectations are not unfairly
interfered with when such restrictions are imposed.264
The validity of this regulatory risk argument in part turns on the foreseeability
of regulation. For example, discovery of an endangered species on property that
greatly limits the property's use and consequently reduces its value is largely
unexpected. Even though at one level such risk can be taken account of, as a
practical matter it is typically unanticipated and concentrated on a few owners,
and thus arguably raising fairness concerns justifying compensation.265 In
contrast, restrictions on land use are more readily anticipated in our society,266
including agricultural restrictions on existing farmland on the urban fringe. 1bis is
particularly true where restrictions are pursuant to careful planning, identifying
land most suitable for continued agricultural use in terms of soil type and location.
Cmmty, 294 N.W.2d 654, 656 (S.D. 1980).
262 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Coip., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (''those who
do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end") (quoting Federal Housing Authority v.
The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
263 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
264 See, e.g., Rumbach, supra note 135, at 367-68; Mandelker, supra note 147, at 233-36;
Michelman, supra note 145, at 415.
265 See Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REY. 305, 360-61 (1997) (stating that the discovery of endangered
species on land "akin to Act ofGod.").
266 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Rumbach, supra note 135, at 367-68.
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In such situations any reasonable landowner expectations must necessarily
recognize that prime fannland is subject to possible restriction. As such,
downzoning of land to agricultural use, which eliminates previous development
opportunities, must fall ,vithin the reasonable expectations of landowners and not
be seen as unfair.
That such downzoning does not violate fairness concerns is further reflected
in the fact that the value of undeveloped property, when zoned for development,
should be discounted to reflect the possibility of greater restrictions at a later
time.267 Thus, the purchaser or holder of such property gets the property at a
reduced value to reflect the risk of possible regulation. In this manner, investment
in undeveloped land inevitably involves a degree of speculation in which the
owner of such land receives a degree of windfall when subsequent restrictions are
not imposed, and a degree of loss when they are.268 Losses under such
circumstances can hardly be viewed as unfair, especially when the possibility of
such regulatory losses can be reasonably anticipated and when in many other
circumstances windfalls are received.

V. CONCLUSION
The last several decades have seen a growing concern over farmland
preservation, most clearly reflected in the variety of state and local efforts to
address conversion concerns. Although each of these programs has a legitimate
role to play in preserving farmland, any serious effort at preservation must
ultimately take the power to convert from landowners. Otherwise, no matter how
many incentives and protections are afforded landowners, they will eventually
succumb to economic pressures to sell. For this reason, agricultural zoning has
become a necessary and central component of most efforts to protect farmland.
However, agricultural zoning is controversial, largely because of the
significant impact it often imposes on landowners under the greatest conversion
pressure. In particular, it is commonly subject to two closely related concerns: that
the substantial diminution in value constitutes an unconstitutional taking and,
even if constitutional, the substantial economic burdens imposed are unfair.
This Article has shown that, if done pursuant to sound planning, agricultural
zoning should not nonnally constitute a taking or be viewed as inherently unfair,
despite substantial economic impacts on owners. Most agricultural zoning should
not be a taking under Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, which focuses on
whether property remains economically viable and the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations. This has been borne out by lower court
decisions, which have typically rejected takings challenges to agricultural zoning.
Where land is not suitable for agricultural use, however, courts have appropriately
267 See Mandelker, supra note 147, at 235-36.
268 See id at 235-36.

1082

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vo160:3

found a taking to exist.
Similarly, agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair even when substantial
economic impact exists. Although it might lack the specific reciprocity often seen
with other land-use regulations, regulatory impacts must be seen from a broader
perspective in which much of the property values were created by government
"givings" and in which landowners benefit from other regulatory measures.
Moreover, our legal system has long recognized that property ownership is
subject to the broader public interest, and reasonable landowner expectations
must incorporate the possibility of regulation to further such interests.
Recognition that agricultural zoning is neither a taking nor inherently unfair
is not meant to preclude consideration of the compensatory alternatives of PDR
and 1DR programs, which also deprive the landowner of decisionmaking
authority. Although not the focus of this Article, when feasible to implement,
such compensatory approaches arguably have two advantages over
uncompensated zoning. First, they might give more permanence to the restrictions
than zoning, which tends to grant changes with ease, especially when subject to
political or developmental pressure. For this reason, zoning is often viewed as an
unstable control mechanism, especially when applied to undeveloped land subject
to substantial development pressure.269 In contrast, restrictions pursuant to PDR
and 1DR programs are more insulated to change pressure, in part because
compensation has been provided to the affected landowner.
Second, the PDR and 1DR compensatory approaches might at times be a
more equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of preservation. Although,
as noted earlier, fairness must be viewed from broad as well as narrow
perspectives, PDR and 1DR programs arguably more closely align the burdens
with the benefits of farmland preservation. Rather than placing the entire burden
of regulation on the affected landowner, with the benefits flowing to the public in
general, the compensatory approaches spread the cost of regulation to the broader
public. With PDRs this is done through increased taxes or other means of revenue
raising, such as impact fees, with the cost thus being imposed on local citizens
generally or some identifiable segment. The cost shifting of 1DR programs is
more subtle, with the burden of preservation falling in several posS1ble places,
including developers who purchase the 1DRs or neighbors in the "receiving''
area.270 Under both the PDR and 1DR approaches, however, the cost of
269 See MALONE, supra note 27 at § 6.08(1); Coughlin & Keene, supra note 67 at 9;
Michael T. Peddle, The Effects of Growth Management Policies on Agricultural Land Values,
at 48 in COMPEITTION FOR THE LAND 27, 48 (1997); White, supra note 7 at 117-18; see also
Church, supra note 5, at 554 (descnbing political problems of enforcing zoning restrictions on
farmland).
270 Assuming the restricted landowner sells the TDR.s to a developer in a designated
"receiving area'' who uses them to exceed otherwise applicable limitations, the out of pocket
expense falls on the developer. However, the developer is receiving benefits in the fonn of
more intensive development, and therefore the true cost arguably falls on surrounding
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preservation is distnouted across a broader spectrwn of society, which, if not
necessarily required by notions of fairness, is nonetheless desirable if it can be
achieved.
These modest equity concerns, together with the greater pennanence afforded
by PDR and IDR programs, suggest that they should be encouraged and pursued
when feasible. Indeed, though experience remains limited, there are indications
that both types ofprograms are seeing a slight increase in use. A number oflocal
governments have established PDR or conservation easement programs in recent
years.271 These have received finther impetus by provisions of the 1996 Farm
Bill, which provided for some matching federal :fimds for state and local PDR
programs.272 Several successful IDR programs have also been developed
specifically for fannland preservation.273 Perhaps the best known is that in
Montgomery Cotmty, Matyland, where a successful IDR program designed to
preserve fannland has been in place for several years274 and to date has preserved
over 38,000 acres offannland.275
Despite these successes, and despite the advantages. of such programs, at the
present time both PDR and IDR programs are realistically limited in their
potential reach. The obvious problem with PDRs is their cost, which makes them
unrealistic for widespread use as a preservation technique, especially in times of
neighbors who are subject to more intense development than would nonnally be the cost. If,
however, the ''receiving area" had been manipulated to be more restrictive than nonnal to make
the IDRs more attractive, then arguably the cost falls on the developer who is paying for
development opportunities that would nonnally have been free absent the IDR program. Cf.
Church, supra note 5, at 552 n.129 (suggesting problem of manipulating restrictions in
''receiving areas" to detriment of property owners in such areas); Fehr, supra note 11 (noting
that some residents in receiving areas under Montgomery County 1DR plan are unhappy about
increased density). The developer would likely pass on at least part of that cost to prospective
consumers of the development In either situation, the cost of preservation is shifted from the
restricted owner offarmland to some segment of the public.
27 1 See White, supra note 7, at 140-43 (discussing successful conservation easement
program in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania).
272 See Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. I 04-127,
110 Stat 888 (1996).
273 See TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND 179-86 {1996)
(descnbing six different IDR programs designed to preserve farmland).
274 See Fehr, supra note 11 (discussing Montgomery County's 1DR program); Sarah J.
Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: 'I'he Government's Role as Banker of Transferable
Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1329, 1355-58 (1998) (descnbing Montgomery
County's IDR program).
275 See American Farmland Trust, Transfer of Development Rights: Fact Sheet (last
modified Sept 1998) <http://Farm.Fic.niu.edu/fic-ta/tafs-tdr.html>. The New Jersey Pinelands
Reserve also has a 1DR component to its Management Plan, which as of 1995 had resulted in
nearly 13,000 acres offarmland protected through use of1DRs. See White, supra note 7, at 139
(descnbing operation of the New Jersey Pinelands Reserve IDR/Farmland program).
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fiscal restraint.276 IDR programs avoid this problem by providing development
rights instead of money, but are contingent on the right mix of ingredients to
succeed, including appropriate "receiving areas" that are restrictive enough to
make the IDRs valuable and which can easily absorb increased development.277
Moreover, successful programs require stability of zoning restrictions so that the
value of IDRs are not undermined.278 Thus, the problem of frequent and easy
change that threatens the efficiency of zoning as a preservation technique
similarly undermines the feasibility ofIDR programs.
For these reasons, PDR and IDR programs will play only a limited role in
farmland preservation in the immediate future,279 with agricultural zoning
necessarily playing a central role in most preservation efforts. Despite the
potential problem of instability, zoning provides a realistic preservation
mechanism for local governments truly committed to that goal. If done pursuant
to sound planning, such zoning should not pose constitutional concerns nor be
inherently unfair to those affected.

276 The fiscal restraints of PDR programs have been noted by numerous commentators.

See, e.g., MALoNE, supra note 27, § 6.11(2); REDFIELD, supra note 5, at 99-100; Church, supra
note 5, at 545-46; Teri E. Popp, A Survey of Agricultural :ZOning: State Responses to the
Fannland Crisis, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 371, 37&-79 (1998); White, supra note 7,

at 141.
277 See, e.g., DANIEL & BOWERS, supra note 273, at 187-90 (discussing various barriers to
successful TDR programs); Kayden, supra note 90, at 574-79.
278 See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 90, at 578.
279 The actual amount of farmland preserved under PDR and TDR programs, though
growing, is still quite limited. The website for the Center for Agriculture and the Environment
(CAE) has a table documenting local governments with TDR programs as of 1997 and the
amount of farmland actually preserved through such programs. Although several local
governmental bodies, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, have protected significant
amounts of land, the total is less than 70,000 acres, more than half of which comes from
Montgomery County alone. See American Farmland Trust, Transfer ofDevelopment Rights:
Fact Sheet (last modified Sept. 1998) <http://Farm.Fic.niu.edu/fic-ta/tafs-tdr.html>. PDR
programs have shown greater success, with the CAE listing 406,725 acres offarmland that have
been preserved through PDR programs. See id.

